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Owning Nothingness: Between the Legal
and the Social Norms of the Art World
Guy A. Rub*
Almost $8 million—that is what the Crystal Bridges Museum paid
for one work of contemporary art in November 2015. What did that
museum get for that hefty sum? From a legal perspective, absolutely
nothing. The work it purchased was just an idea, and ideas of this kind
escape legal protection.
Despite this lack of legal protection, the social norms of the art world
lead large, sophisticated, experienced, and legally represented institutes to
pay millions of dollars for this type of work. This Article is one of the first
in legal scholarship to examine at depth those norms in this multibilliondollar industry. It does so by, inter alia, reporting on interviews the author
conducted with industry insiders concerning their practices. This Article
suggests that those norms create property-like rights in all artworks,
whether or not they are legally protected, as well as an ongoing right of
artists to partly control the use of their works. Those social norms fill a
gap between the ways in which the contemporary art world understands
creativity and the ways in which our legal system actually incentivizes
creative endeavors.
This Article analyzes the normative implications of these social norms
and the gap they fill. First, it explains how those norms incentivize certain
forms of creativity in a way that is more effective and efficient than
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. I would like
to thank the curators, museum administrators, and other industry insiders who agreed to
discuss their work with me, as well as Brian Frye, Laura Heymann, Amalyah Keshet, Efthimi
Parasidis, the participants of the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (IPSC) at Cardozo
Law, Penn State Faculty Workshop, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Faculty
Workshop, the Junior IP Scholars Association (JIPSA) workshop at Northwestern School of
Law, the Law & Technology Workshop at Tel-Aviv University Faculty of Law, and the
Advance Topics in IP Workshop at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem for their valuable
comments; Matthew Krsacok and Jordan Powers for outstanding and indispensable research
assistance; and The Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies at The Ohio State
University for financially supporting this study. The study reported in this Article was
approved by The Ohio State University’s Office of Responsible Research Practices. The
remaining errors are, of course, my own.
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property rights. Second, going beyond the art world, the Article shows
how the social norms expose certain hidden assumptions in copyright
authorship and their shortcomings. It suggests how the law can be
improved to account for the richer description of creativity this Article
provides. Third, the Article contributes to the ongoing debate concerning
private property ownership. The art world provides sellers with significant
post-sale control over their works in a way that the law commonly finds
undesirable. That tension might justify rethinking the current legal rules
that disincentivize post-sale control.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost $8 million—that is what the Crystal Bridges Museum
paid for one work of contemporary art in November 2015.1 What
did that museum get for that hefty sum? From a legal perspective,
absolutely nothing.
In its official announcement of the acquisition, the museum
described the work, by the renowned conceptual artist Felix
Gonzalez-Torres, as “small, green candies wrapped in cellophane
[that] are spread across the gallery floor, so that viewers may touch,
take, and consume the work, which can be endlessly replenished.”2
But what does that mean from a legal perspective?
The museum did not purchase any chattel because there is
none. As the announcement of the acquisition makes clear, every
time the work is installed, candies are placed on the gallery floor
only to be taken by viewers and be replenished by the museum. The
original candies that the artist used are long gone. The museum also
did not purchase any intangible legal rights. The only such right
that comes to mind is copyright.3 However, nobody can seriously
claim that copyright law protects the notion of placing green
candies on a gallery floor for viewers to take. That is nothing more
than an idea, and ideas are not protected by copyright.4
The Crystal Bridges Museum is not the only museum that paid
a small fortune for buying “rights” in artwork that the law does not
recognize.5 Considering that conceptual art is one of the most
1. Kelly Crow, Christie’s Sells $331.8 Million of Art, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 10, 2015,
10:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/christies-sells-331-8-million-worth-of-art-1447212399.
2. Crystal Bridges Museum of American Art Acquires Artwork by Felix Gonzalez-Torres,
CRYSTAL BRIDGES MUSEUM AM. ART (Nov. 16, 2015), https://crystalbridges.org/blog/crystalbridges-museum-of-american-art-acquires-artwork-by-felix-gonzalez-torres.
3. See infra notes 131–34 and accompanying text.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (“In no case does copyright protection . . . extend to any
idea . . . .”); see also infra Section II.D (explaining why this and similar works are unprotected
and in the public domain).
5. See, e.g., infra note 72; see also Colin Gleadell, Tino Sehgal: Invisible Art Worth £100k,
TELEGRAPH (May 7, 2013, 12:27 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/artnews/10041272/Tino-Sehgal-Invisible-art-worth-100k.html (describing the purchase of a
Tino Sehgal work by The Museum of Modern Art in New York); Zoë Lescaze, How Does a
Museum Buy an Artwork That Doesn’t Physically Exist?, N.Y. TIMES STYLE MAG. (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/t-magazine/tino-sehgal-hirshhorn-museum-art.html
(exploring the ways in which the Hirshhorn Museum and other institutes purchase and
handle works that have no tangible existence, focusing on the works of Tino Sehgal, which
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influential art movements in the last fifty years,6 it is hard to find a
respectable museum with a decent contemporary art collection that
does not claim to “own,” or at least “borrow” such nothingness.7
This conundrum—the willingness of large, sophisticated,
experienced, and legally represented institutes to pay millions of
dollars and to engage in transactions over legal nothingness—is the
driving force of this work. The solution to that puzzle and the
answer to the question about what the Crystal Bridges Museum
and similar institutions purchase for millions of dollars is not found
in any statute, legal rule, or caselaw. It is rooted in the social norms
of the art world. To explore those norms, and the gap between them
and our legal framework, I conducted interviews with industry
insiders and studied multiple industry-related publications and
reports.8 The result is an account of the norms of this multibilliondollar industry.
While our legal system incentivizes multiple forms of creativity,
this Article explains that there is a gap in that legal framework
which is especially pertinent to the art world. Indeed, some forms
of creativity, specifically concerning ideas, are left unprotected and
seemingly under-incentivized.9 However, the legal norms of the art
world—including those that require museums to pay for legal
nothingness—effectively provide those incentives. Therefore,
extending copyright law protection is unnecessary.10
The impacts of the social norms this Article explores go beyond
the art world. Those norms expose and question our legal
framework for protecting creativity and its hidden underlying
assumptions, as well as broader and controversial notions
regarding authorship and even ownership. The Article shows how
consist of actors interacting with museum visitors); Elise Taylor, The $120,000 Art Basel
Banana, Explained, VOGUE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.vogue.com/article/the-120000-artbasel-banana-explained-maurizio-cattelan (discussing a work of the conceptual artist
Maurizio Cattelan, titled Comedian, that consists of a banana taped to a wall, and was sold to
three buyers, each paying $120,000 or more for it; on December 7, 2019, an installation of the
work at Art Basel Miami was famously eaten, without authorization, by the performing artist
David Datuna).
6. See, e.g., Lisa S. Wainwright, Conceptual Art, BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/art/conceptual-art (last visited Feb. 19, 2020); see also Justin Wolf, Conceptual
Art, ART STORY (OCT 1, 2012), https://www.theartstory.org/movement/conceptual-art/.
7. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 157–59.
8. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 221–30 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 232–40 and accompanying text.
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existing copyright law rules, especially those concerning
authorship, might be too narrowly focused. It therefore suggests
how those rules can be modified to take into account the richer
description of creativity that this Article provides.11 The Article
concludes by providing a new angle to an ongoing and heated
debate concerning the nature of private property ownership itself.12
It suggests that the legal perception of ownership is likely too
narrowly construed and that a more holistic approach—one that
takes into account developments outside of the legal system—
might improve the law.
***
This Article proceeds in four parts. The first two parts introduce
the gap between the contemporary art world and the legal system
that purports to support and incentivize creativity. They explain
how contemporary artists push the boundaries of creativity in an
attempt to challenge the art world, but in doing so, they also
undermine core principles in our legal system.
Part I briefly introduces certain developments in the art world
during the last century and focuses on the emergence of conceptual
art, one of the most consequential developments in that period.13
Conceptual art is an art form that questions the nature of art itself.
As such it constantly pushes the boundaries of the definition of
art.14 As the name suggests, conceptual art focuses on the concept,
or idea, behind an artwork, and not on the execution of that idea.
This led to the so-called dematerialization of artworks.15 Many
conceptual artists take the centrality of ideas to the next logical step:
If only ideas matter, those artists ask, why should they bother to
create tangible artwork at all? They, therefore, create artwork that
is nothing more than pure ideas. Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s work,
with which this Article opens,16 is an example of an artwork whose
entire value is in its idea (placing candies on the museum’s floor)
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Section IV.C.
See Wainwright, supra note 6.
See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
The phrase was first coined in Lucy R. Lippard & John Chandler, The Dematerialization
of Art, ART INT’L, Feb. 1968, reprinted in CHANGING: ESSAYS IN ART CRITICISM 255 (1971).
16. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2.

1151

001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/5/20 9:52 PM

2019

and not its execution (actually placing them). Part I examines some
of those works and explains how conceptual artists, like GonzalezTorres, are able to powerfully comment on important
developments in our society—the AIDS epidemic in the case
of Gonzalez-Torres—by creating works that are, in essence, just
pure ideas.17
Part II examines the other side of the law-art gap by focusing on
the legal system. Specifically, it introduces the ways in which the
law protects and incentivizes creativity and why conceptual
artworks commonly escape such protection, becoming legal
nothingness. The two main ways by which the law protects and
incentivizes creativity are personal property law and copyright
law. Those regimes work in tandem to provide different forms of
protection for different works.18 Some creators, including most fine
artists, at least before the twentieth century,19 produce unique
authentic goods, which are protected by private property rights.
Those creators earn a living primarily by selling their ownership
interest in those goods.20 Other creators, such as book authors and
recording musicians, produce goods, such as manuscripts and
master recordings, that are not considered to be authentic or hold
special intrinsic value.21 Those creators generate income by selling
copies of their creations. Copyright law is designed to address the
economic reality that those creators face and the relevant market
failures. In other words, the law allows them to generate income by
exclusively controlling the creation of new copies.22
This framework applies to tangible objects, like books,
paintings, and sculptures, but not to ideas. The standard account of
intellectual property law theory is that ideas, at least if they are

17. See infra Section I.C.
18. I briefly explored the different modes of creativity commercialization and legal

protection in my previous work, especially in Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Case for Resale
Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. F. 1, 4–5 (2014).
19. This Article uses the terms “fine art” and “visual art” interchangeably to refer to
the type of art that is typically presented in a single copy in museums. This is a rather narrow
definition but, for the most part, it follows the legal definition of the term “work of visual
art,” as used within the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). See also infra notes 120–23 and
accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 96–97.
22. See infra text accompanying note 99.
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public, can only be protected by patents.23 Ideas that do not meet
the high threshold of patentability are therefore unprotected and
free for the taking.24
Part II concludes by analyzing the ways in which conceptual art
challenges core notions and hidden assumptions in the law.25
It shows that the very same choices that conceptual artists make in
an intentional attempt to expose and undermine the art world’s
preconceptions also challenge existing legal norms. While
conceptual artists focus on generating creative ideas and consider
the execution of those ideas trivial and uninteresting, copyright law
makes the exact opposite assumption concerning creativity: it
expects the heart of a work and its main source of value to be in its
expression and not ideas.26 This mismatch makes copyright law an
inadequate tool for incentivizing and protecting conceptual art.
Similarly, while the notion of pure-idea artworks might free artists
from the shackles of tangible expression and allow them to focus
their creative energy on developing ideas, it turns their work into
legal nothingness.
Indeed, pure-idea works fall between the cracks of our legal
framework for protecting creativity. They are unprotected by
copyright and are not subject to personal property rights. As a legal
matter, they simply cannot be owned. If they cannot be owned, they
cannot be sold. If they cannot be sold, how are conceptual artists
expected to make a living?
The answer to that question, as Part III explains, is that the
social norms of the art world provide all artists, including
conceptual artists, with powerful rights with respect to their
creations. Those norms allow artists to get paid for their works and
to partly control their future use, whether those works are legally
protected or not. To better understand those norms, I studied
industry publications and interviews with artists, curators, and
23. Non-public ideas can be protected by other legal norms, such as trade secrets. See
Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has
Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703 (2006) (exploring the legal doctrines that protect confidential
ideas); infra text accompanying notes 224–29.
24. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law Hybridization, 87 U. COLO. L. REV.
65, 65, 75–76 (2016) (“[P]atent law aims to incentivize the production of inventive ideas,
while copyright focuses on protecting the original expression of ideas, but not the underlying
ideas themselves.”).
25. See infra Section II.D.
26. See infra text accompanying note 127.
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other industry insiders. In addition, I conducted my own
interviews with industry insiders and reviewed agreements
entered into by their institutes.27
Part III separates the rights that the social norms provide to
artists into two main (related) categories. First, according to those
norms, artists initially own every work they come up with, whether
or not a tangible object was created. The artists are therefore
granted what this Article calls pseudo personal property rights (or
pseudo-ownership) even in pure ideas.28 Section III.A analyzes the
nature of those socially created property-like rights. Those rights
initially vest with the artists, but they can be transferred, including
by sales and loans, to others. At the heart of this regime is the social
norm, shared by all industry insiders I spoke with, that no museum
or gallery will ever present a work unless it is the work’s (pseudo)
owner, or the work is on loan from the (pseudo) owner. Otherwise,
such a work is considered fake.
Because museums and galleries will not present any
dematerialized artwork unless they pseudo-own it (or it is on loan
from the pseudo-owner), there is only one copy of the work
presented at any given time.29 The result is that the idea that forms
a work, which is, by its nature, non-rivalrous (i.e., can be enjoyed
by many simultaneously) becomes rivalrous: only one entity may
“possess” it at any given time. While the work is presented at
Alice’s gallery, Bruce’s gallery will not present it. This important
norm thus creates artificial scarcity which allows artists to earn
income by selling their works—their pseudo-ownership rights.30
Second, a separate but related set of social norms allows artists
to exercise a certain level of control over the use of their works, even
after they are sold.31 Indeed, the art world recognizes an ongoing
connection between artists and their works. Specifically, the art
world gives artists a right to be consulted concerning the ways their
works are presented and a right to affect the authentication of what

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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is perceived to be their works.32 The law too arms artists with a
certain post-sale control, both through copyright law and the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).33 This Article compares and
contrasts the nature of the social norms to the legal norms, and
finds the first to be more flexible and context sensitive.34
Interestingly, the art world often uses legal terminology to describe
its social norms.35 This inaccurate use of legal terms—sometimes to
describe legal nothingness—might be a way for the industry to give
even greater legitimacy to its norms.36
Part IV examines the normative implications of these social
norms and how they should inform the development of the law on
three fronts. First, this Article suggests that the social norms of the
art world fill a gap in our legal framework, which does not
incentivize the creation of certain public ideas.37 Indeed, the social
norms regime operates mostly in a negative space where creativity
exists without IP protection.38 They incentivize creativity in a way
that is effective, flexible, and likely superior to any property

32. Authenticity means more than just determining whether works were actually
created by a certain artist, but it takes into account additional factors such as whether the
artist feels that the works still represent her artistic vision. Artistic authenticity, which plays
a significant role throughout this Article, has received limited attention in legal scholarship,
although that attention has been growing in recent years. See, e.g., Amy Adler, Why Art Does
Not Need Copyright, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 313, 342–51 (2018); Derek Fincham, Authenticating
Art by Valuing Art Experts, 86 MISS. L.J. 567 (2017); Laura A. Heymann, Dialogues of
Authenticity, 67 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 25 (2015); Sonia K. Katyal, Technoheritage, 105 CALIF. L.
REV. 1111 (2017). In other fields, and especially in art history research and in philosophy,
authenticity is a major topic of study. See also infra note 88 and accompanying text.
33. Codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2018).
34. See infra Section III.C.
35. See infra text accompanying note 162.
36. See infra text accompanying note 162.
37. See infra Section IV.A.
38. The term “negative space” was famously coined in Kal Raustiala & Christopher
Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1687, 1764 (2006). In recent years, creative social norms in various industries were
explored in the copyright literature. See, e.g., CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE
ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017)
(exploring several case studies in which creativity exists in industries that either do not offer
copyright protection, or offer it in limited scope); Stephanie Plamondon Bair & Laura G.
Pedraza-Fariña, Anti-Innovation Norms, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1069, 1136 (2018) (exploring the
recent social norms scholarship in all areas of IP law); Robert Spoo, Courtesy Paratexts:
Informal Publishing Norms and the Copyright Vacuum in Nineteenth-Century America, 69 STAN.
L. REV. 637 (2017) (examining how social norms of the publishing industry protected foreign
literary works); infra note 231 and accompanying text.
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norms.39 In other words, this gap in our legal framework
should not be addressed by the legal system, but by the pertinent
industry itself.
Second, the social norms shed light on the nature of copyright
authorship, its underlying assumptions and their shortcomings,
and the ways to improve it. When a work is created by a group of
individuals, which is common, identifying the one who is initially
entitled to copyright protection—that is, the author—is one of the
main challenges of copyright law.40 Courts have developed tests
that typically grant authorship to those who control the fixation—
that is, the execution—of a work.41 Those tests have become highly
controversial in recent years both domestically and internationally,
as they arguably unfairly reward some, like producers, while
excluding others, like actors or vocalists.42
This Article contributes to this heated debate. In the context of
conceptual art, the one who controls the execution of the work
might not be the artist who came up with an idea, but a curator who
executed it.43 Elevating curators to be authors is, of course, absurd.
Indeed, the analysis shows that copyright law’s notion of
authorship might be too narrow. This Article, therefore, provides
support to those who call for a more holistic approach to
authorship.44 It explains how the law may be modified to account
for this possible shortcoming.45

39. See infra text accompanying notes 232–40.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 241–43.
41. See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that

the movie producer and director is the sole author and not an actor); 16 Casa Duse, L.L.C. v.
Merkin, 791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a producer and not a director is the author);
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a director and not an
advisor on set is the author).
42. See, e.g., Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, World Intellectual Property
Organization, June 24, 2012, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/avp_dc/
avp_dc_20.pdf; infra text accompanying notes 249–51. The topic of authorship also attracted
much attention from legal scholars in recent years. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1015, 1035–37 (2015); Christopher
Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1234–35 (2016); Dan L.
Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1535, 1550 (2013); Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA
L. REV. 1102, 1124–27 (2017).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 259–61.
44. See infra note 249.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 262–63.
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Third, this Article offers a new angle to an old problem: Can
sellers of chattel restrict their buyers’ use thereof? This question
goes to the heart of our understanding of personal property
ownership. While it has intrigued legal scholars for centuries,46 the
issue has attracted a growing attention in recent years.47 The
reasons for that renewed interest have to do with developments in
the law—especially as a result of recent Supreme Court decisions
which broadly interpret rights in chattel (at the expense of
intellectual property rights)48—and the emergence of new models
of ownership in the marketplace, empowered by modern
technologies, such as those offered by the sharing economy.49
What is often missing from this debate is the impact of social
norms on the perception of private property ownership.50 This
Article starts to fill this gap by noting that the art world
demonstrates how an industry can create flexible property-like
rights over sold goods.51 Those rights provide the artists-sellers
with broad post-sale control over the use of their works, in a way
that is in tension with the legal norms, which often disfavor such
control. This Article, therefore, suggests that it might be prudent to

46. See infra note 264.
47. See infra text accompanying note 265.
48. Impression Prods., Inc., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2017) (holding

that a purchaser can resell patented items “because those are the rights that come along with
ownership”); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 530, 551 (2013) (holding that
personal property rights allow importation and resale of copyrighted works purchased
abroad because “full ownership of a lawfully-made copy authorizes its owner to dispose of
it freely” (quoting H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION pt.
5, at 66 (Comm. Print 1965))); see also Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling
Intellectual Property and Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1211–12 (2015)
(discussing the tension between “ownership of the copyright” and “ownership of the copy”);
Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 760–62 (2015) (discussing
how the common law notion of chattel should affect modern copyright law).
49. See, e.g., Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 65944, 65953–55 (Oct. 28, 2015)
(codified, as amended, at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(9) (2019)) (considering whether car ownership
entails a right to circumvent the software installed in the vehicle); Dave Fagundes, Why Less
Property Is More: Inclusion, Dispossession, and Subjective Well-Being, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1361,
1380–94 (2018) (examining how the sharing economy, among others, challenges the notions
of exclusion and possession of chattel); infra text accompanying notes 278–80.
50. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 121–25 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that
human behavior is typically shaped by four forces: the law, the market, the architecture (i.e.,
technical and physical constraints), and social norms).
51. Infra Section IV.C.
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rethink the inflexibility of the legal norms concerning private
property ownership.52
I. THE SUBJECT OF LEGAL NOTHINGNESS:
CONCEPTUAL DEMATERIALIZED ART
This Article focuses on the gap between the legal norms that
encourage creativity and the current social norms of the art world.
This Part provides the readers with a brief introduction to one side
of this gap: the contemporary art world. It focuses on the
conceptual art movement and especially the notion of
dematerialized artworks—works that are nothing more than pure
ideas. Scholars of contemporary art have published hundreds of
books and articles about this movement, and this Part cannot
explore that vast literature. Instead, it provides the necessary
background to understand the discussion and the legal analysis
that follows.
Defining conceptual art might be more than nontrivial or
difficult. It might be impossible. I could not find a truly satisfactory
definition.53 That failure might not be a failure at all. Conceptual art
rose as an anti-formalistic movement that opposes boxing art in a
formalistic, scientific, or empirical way.54 Avoiding an exact
definition is, therefore, more of a feature of conceptual art than a
bug. Nevertheless, the next few pages introduce conceptual art and
its contribution to the art world. Section A discusses the readymade
movement, which, in many respects, is the predecessor that led to
the emergence of conceptual art. Section B examines some of the
52. Infra Section IV.C.
53. See also TONY GODFREY, CONCEPTUAL ART 12 (1998) (“[T]here has never been a

generally accepted definition of Conceptual art, though many have been proposed.”).
54. See, e.g., Joseph Kosuth, Art After Philosophy, 178 STUDIO INT’L 134 (1969), as
reprinted in CONCEPTUAL ART: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 158, 165 (Alexander Alberro & Blake
Stimson eds., 1999) (explaining that conceptual art rejects attempts to define art through
formulas, or by using aesthetic considerations).
It is worth noting that copyright law perceives art in a formalistic way that is antithetic
to the notions of contemporary art. For example, the extrinsic test, as used by many courts to
consider if a work is infringing on another, “compares the objective similarities of specific
expressive elements in the two works.” Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir.
2020) (en banc). The test “depends . . . on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed.”
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977). In other words, the fact finder is expected to analytically dissect the work to its
elements and to analyze them in an objective or scientific way. As explained above,
conceptual artists do not perceive art as something that can be analyzed in this way.
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main features of conceptual art. Section C uses the work of Felix
Gonzalez-Torres to demonstrate how conceptual artists can create
works that are powerful and moving and yet consist of ideas.
A. The Historic Predecessor of Conceptual Art: Readymade
While the term “Conceptual Art” originated in a 1961 essay by
the philosopher Henry Flynt,55 and even though the movement
gained momentum and a central place starting in the late 1960s,
its origins are earlier than that. As this section explains, it can be
traced to cubism and more importantly to the readymade school
of the 1910s.
Those movements, much like conceptual art, focused on
exploring “what is art.” This exploration included, among other
things, using objects or industrial products that were not normally
considered artistic. In 1912, Pablo Picasso may have been the first
renowned artist to do this when he pasted a printed image of a chair
and an industrial rope to a canvas as part of his cubist work Still
Life with Chair Caning.56 The readymade movement is, however,
commonly identified with the artist that many consider to be the
founding father and the main inspiration for conceptual art: Marcel
Duchamp. As the famous conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth noted,
“All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual . . . .”57
One narrative that runs through much of
Duchamp’s work is questioning and pushing
the boundaries of the art world.58 In 1917, for
example, he purchased a urinal, turned it on its
back, placed it on a pedestal, signed it as
“R.Mutt 1917,” and named it Fountain.59 He
then submitted it to the first annual exhibition
of the Society of Independent Artists.60 The society originally

55. Henry Flynt, Concept Art, in AN ANTHOLOGY OF CHANCE OPERATIONS (La Monte
Young ed., 1963) (defining conceptual art, in an essay that gave the movement its name, as
the antithesis to “structure art”).
56. See RICHARD LEWIS & SUSAN I. LEWIS, THE POWER OF ART 401 (2nd ed. 2008).
57. Kosuth, supra note 54, at 164.
58. THOMAS MCEVILLEY, THE TRIUMPH OF ANTI-ART 16–29 (2005).
59. GODFREY, supra note 53, at 28. But see ZING TSJENG, FORGOTTEN WOMEN: THE
ARTISTS 114 (2018) (suggesting that Fountain was actually created by Elsa von FreytagLoringhoven and not Duchamp).
60. GODFREY, supra note 53, at 28.

1159

001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/5/20 9:52 PM

2019

promised to accept every work of art, but, once it received Fountain,
it questioned whether this was art at all. The work—later
considered one of the most important and influential works of the
twentieth century—was not shown in the exhibition.61
B. From Readymade to Conceptual Art
Like readymade, conceptual art is an art form about art and
artistic meaning.62 It builds on earlier inquiries about the nature of
art, such as those of Duchamp’s readymade movement, but, as
further explained below, it pushes them, and the boundaries of the
art world, even further.
The conceptual art movement stresses certain notions that will
be important for the discussion in later parts of this Article. Like the
readymade movement (and other early twentieth century
movements in modern art), conceptual art devalues artistic
craftsmanship.63 Pre-twentieth-century art centered on artistic
skills. Indeed, it is hard to look at a Rembrandt or a Van Gogh
painting and not appreciate the masterful way in which those
artists used oil paint. As the twentieth century progressed, the focus
of artistry shifted.64 Picasso was a gifted and skillful painter, but
when he created Still Life with Chair Caning, he chose to paste a
printed image of a chair, instead of drawing one, which did not
require any special skills. Duchamp took the notion further. Many
of his works, including Fountain, do not require any special skills,
at least not the type of artistic skills that is being taught in a drawing
or a sculpturing class. Conceptual art similarly typically does not
require special skills. In fact, conceptual artists often stress that their
works are intentionally simple to execute.65

61. Id. at 28–29.
62. See, e.g., Arthur R. Rose, Four Interviews, ARTS MAG., Feb. 1969, at 22, 23 (quoting

Joseph Kosuth) (“Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is
questioning the nature of painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art; if an artist
accepts painting (or sculpture) he is accepting the tradition that goes with it. . . . If you make
paintings you are already accepting (not questioning) the nature of art.”).
63. JOHN A. PARKS, UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF ART 50 (2015) (“With the advent of
modernism, craft has become increasingly divorced from the fine arts. . . . With Conceptual
Art . . . the importance of craftsmanship disappears altogether.”).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Lippard & Chandler, supra note 15, at 257 (describing “highly conceptual
art” as including “monotonal or extremely simple-looking painting and totally ‘dumb’
objects” because they “demand more participation by the viewer”).
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As the value of artistic craftsmanship was significantly
declining, the importance of the work became attributable to
another component—the ideas it embodies. As the important
conceptual artist Sol LeWitt explained, “[i]n conceptual art the idea
or concept is the most important aspect of the work.”66
Many conceptual artists took this notion to its logical
conclusion. If the value of the work lies in its idea, then artists
should devote their artistic energy to creating ideas, and, possibly,
nothing more. This led to a phenomenon that Lucy Lippard and
John Chandler famously called “The Dematerialization of Art” in
which “the object[] becom[es] wholly obsolete.”67 Therefore, in
creating dematerialized artworks, artists do not produce any
tangible object. Instead, they come up with a set of simple
instructions. Those who present the work, mostly museums and
galleries, follow those instructions and create what is commonly
known as “an installation” of the work.68
C. The Work of Felix Gonzalez-Torres
To demonstrate how art can be both meaningful and
dematerialized, this section explores the work of Felix GonzalezTorres, including his candy-based works, like the one with which
this Article opens.
Felix Gonzalez-Torres was born in Cuba in 1957. In 1979, he
moved to New York City, where he lived and worked until his
death from complications related to AIDS in 1996.69 The
Guggenheim museum described Gonzalez-Torres’s work as
“[e]mploying simple, everyday materials . . . and a reduced
aesthetic vocabulary . . . to address themes such as love and loss,

66. Sol LeWitt, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, ARTFORUM , June 1967, at 80 (explaining
that “[i]n conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work” and
that “the execution is a perfunctory affair”); see also GODFREY, supra note 53, at 4
(“Conceptual art is not about forms or materials, but about ideas and meanings.”); infra
Section II.D (returning to LeWitt’s explanations and analyzing the significant legal
implications thereof).
67. Lippard & Chandler, supra note 15, at 255.
68. Some even classify this type of work, which is installed and not just presented like
a painting or a statue, installation art. See CLAIRE BISHOP, INSTALLATION ART 6–8 (2005).
69. NANCY SPECTOR, FELIX GONZALEZ-TORRES: AMERICA 62–63 (2007).
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sickness and rejuvenation, gender and sexuality.”70 GonzalezTorres was not only one of the most critically acclaimed and heavily
researched and discussed conceptual artists, but he was also one of
the most popular and commercially successful visual artists, both
in his lifetime and thereafter.71 Nowadays, Gonzalez-Torres’s
works are sold for millions of dollars72 and they continue to intrigue
commentators from multiple disciplines.73
Some of Gonzalez-Torres’s most famous works, including
his most commercially successful pieces, consist of installations
of candies. In exploring these works and the legal questions they
raise, this Article focuses on one such work: “Untitled” (Portrait of
Ross in L.A.).
“Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) consists of 175 pounds of
candies. The work, as created by Gonzalez-Torres in 1991, is
nothing more than a set of general instructions on how to exhibit
those candies. According to those instructions, the candies are to be
individually wrapped in multicolor cellophane.74 Visitors to the
exhibit, the instructions continue, are invited to take candies

70. Felix Gonzalez-Torres, GUGGENHEIM, https://www.guggenheim.org/artwork/
artist/felix-gonzalez-torres (last visited Feb. 19, 2020); see also Randy Kennedy, Tough Art
with a Candy Center, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/07/ arts/
design/07bien.html.
71. Felix Gonzalez-Torres, supra note 70 (listing several fellowships that GonzalezTorres won and many of his shows exhibited before and after his death).
72. Kyle Chayka, Candy Sells for $4.5 Million at Philips de Pury Auction, HYPERALLERGIC
(Nov. 9, 2010), https://hyperallergic.com/12202/candy-sells-philips-de-pury (reporting on
a sale of a Gonzalez-Torres work for $4.5 million); Leslie Newell Peacock, High-priced Candy:
“Untitled” (L.A.) Acquired by Crystal Bridges, ARK. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015, 5:44 PM),
https://www.arktimes.com/RockCandy/archives/2015/11/16/high-priced-candyuntitled-la-acquired-by-crystal-bridges (reporting on a sale of another Gonzalez-Torres work
for $7.67 million); Revolt of the Rich?, ARTNET (May 11, 2011), http://www.artnet.com/
magazineus/news/artmarketwatch/sothebys-2001-spring-contemporary-sale-5-11-11.asp
(reporting on a sale of Gonzalez-Torres prints for $1.65 million).
73. There are quite a few examples from recent years that demonstrate the tremendous
interest in Gonzalez-Torres and his work, including multiple new books, articles, and
exhibitions. See, e.g., ELENA FILIPOVIC ET AL., FELIX GONZALEZ-TORRES: SPECIFIC OBJECTS
WITHOUT SPECIFIC FORM (2016); ROBERT STORR ET AL., FELIX GONZALEZ-TORRES (Julie Ault
ed., 2d ed. 2016); Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento, Law in the Work of Félix
González-Torres, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449 (2017) (introducing a small symposium on
Gonzales-Torres); M.H. Miller, A Colossal New Show Revisits a Conceptual Art Icon, N.Y. TIMES
STYLE MAG. (May 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/t-magazine/art/felixgonzalez-torres-zwirner-new-york-show.html (covering a large-scale new exhibition of Felix
Gonzalez-Torres work at David Zwirner Gallery).
74. JONATHAN D. KATZ & DAVID C. WARD, HIDE/SEEK: DIFFERENCE AND DESIRE IN
AMERICAN PORTRAITURE 224 (2010).
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with them. The owner of the space—typically a museum—is
allowed to replenish the candies every day if it chooses to do so, or
it can let them disappear.75 The instructions do not dictate the shape
or arrangement of the candies.
Gonzalez-Torres named all his works “Untitled,” but, in
parentheses, he included more telling titles. In this case, “Ross”
refers to Gonzalez-Torres’s longtime life partner, Ross Laycock,
who died of complications related to AIDS in 1991.76 The candies
might
therefore
represent
the
sweetness of their relationship.77 The
weight, 175 pounds, was Ross’s
weight when he was healthy, and the
taking of the candies by the exhibit’s
visitors represents the dwindling of
his body as he was fighting AIDS.78
One can suggest that the taking of the
candies by the public points to the
shared responsibility of the American public at large in
allowing the AIDS epidemic to take such a high toll on the gay
community at the time.79 Finally, the replenishment of the candies,
if the exhibit owner chooses to do so, might represent the circle of
life and death.80
Indeed, “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) is an example of a
powerful and socially meaningful work that consists of nothing but
ideas that can be simply executed. With simple instructions on how
to use candies, Gonzalez-Torres was able to comment on both his
private relationship with his life partner and on society’s treatment
of the gay community during the AIDS epidemic crisis.

75. Id.
76. RENATE LORENZ, QUEER ART: A FREAK THEORY 136–37 (2012).
77. KATZ & WARD, supra note 74, at 224; Stephanie Eckardt, The New Met Breuer Wants

You to Take Candies, Not Photos, W MAGAZINE (Mar. 13, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.
wmagazine.com/story/felix-gonzalez-torres-candy-the-met-breuer.
78. Eckardt, supra note 77.
79. KATZ & WARD, supra note 74, at 224.
80. Id. While this is the common explanation of the work, Gonzalez-Torres, like most
conceptual artists, rarely provided detailed explanations of his works. See, e.g., NANCY
SPECTOR, FELIX GONZALEZ-TORRES 11 (1995) (explaining that conceptual artists believe that
“meaning does not fully reside in authorial intentions”); LeWitt, supra note 66, at 79
(criticizing “the notion that the artist is a kind of ape that has to be explained by the
civilized critic”).
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II. THE LEGAL NOTHINGNESS: RIGHTS IN CONCEPTUAL ARTWORKS
In this Part, this Article moves from the powerful, inspiring,
and thought-provoking art to the corresponding legal norms.
Specifically, this Part explores the legal framework in which fine
artists operate, and how it fits, or does not fit, conceptual art. This
Part claims that just as contemporary artists question long-held
notions of the art world, they similarly challenge existing legal
norms, and by doing so they shed light on certain hidden
assumptions in our legal system and their possible shortcomings.
Creativity, in general, is supported by two property regimes:
private property law and intellectual property law, and in
particular copyright law. Section A examines the role of private
property rights in incentivizing creativity. Section B explains why
some forms of creativity cannot effectively use private property
rights and instead rely on intellectual property protection.
Section C explains that while copyright is typically used to prevent
free and unrestricted reproduction, it can at times also be used just
to control certain post-sale use of works, which is common for
visual artists.
After this Article explores both conceptual art (in Part I) and the
legal framework for incentivizing creativity (in sections A through
C of this Part), section D analyzes the gap between the two, which
is one of the driving forces of this Article. It explains why the legal
framework does not work for conceptual artists, and how their
choices challenge our legal system.
A. The Role of Personal Property Rights in Protecting Fine Art
Personal property law recognizes rights in chattels.81 As
personal property rights are typically transferable, the law fosters
trade and forms the basis for significant parts of our economy.82
This rather trivial notion allows many industries—some more
creative than others—to operate effectively. Carpenters, for
example, buy wood and nails and use their talent and time to create

81. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 796 (2nd ed. 2005).
82. Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 953, 954 (2005)

(“[Property rights] force the parties to the bargaining table, where the Coase Theorem takes
over and assets are deployed to their highest and best uses. . . . Property rights plus free
contracting make this possible.”).
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furniture. The law, of course, recognizes their property rights in the
furniture, which means that others are excluded from taking or
using them without the carpenter’s permission.83 Carpenters can
sell those rights and use the proceeds to cover the costs associated
with the creation of the furniture. If the proceeds do not cover the
carpenter’s costs, the standard economic theory suggests that some
changes will need to be made: the carpenter will need to reduce the
costs, raise the prices, or look for another line of employment.
The same reasoning that applies to carpenters applies to many
other manufacturers and industries. Importantly, it also applies to
fine artists. Pablo Picasso, for example, purchased a large canvas
and oil paints, and used his talents, skills, and time—twenty-four
days to be exact—to create Guernica, which, in 1938, he sold to the
Spanish government for 200,000 francs.84 That source of income
should have allowed Picasso to cover his costs, or else, like any
other producer, he should have either reduced his costs, increased
his prices, or changed profession. This is the heart of the economic
model that fine artists work under—one that I elsewhere called a
“single copy business model”85: they create unique physical goods
and earn a living by selling them.
Copyright protection is, therefore, not needed under this singlecopy business model. While, as further discussed in section C,
Picasso’s works are protected by copyright, this is not the main
source of income for him and most visual artists.86 Indeed, from this
perspective, there is little difference between Pablo Picasso and a
carpenter. They both produce goods and sell them. They do not
work in a lawless environment. Both primarily rely on personal
property law (as well as other legal norms such as those rooted in
contract law) to support their activities.

83. SINGER, supra note 81, at 796–97.
84. A Journey Through the Exhibition:

Guernica, NAT’L GALLERY OF VICT.,
https://www.ngv.vic.gov.au/picasso/education/ed_JTE_ITG.html (last visited Feb. 19,
2020). Other sources, however, note that the work was not sold to the Spanish government,
but commissioned by it. Guernica, 1937 by Pablo Picasso, PABLO PICASSO, https://www.
pablopicasso.org/guernica.jsp (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
85. Rub, supra note 18, at 4.
86. See Adler, supra note 32, at 335–37 (suggesting that the income of artists from
selling reproductions and derivative works is insignificant). But see Brian L. Frye, Art Law &
the Law of the Horse 6 (Dec. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at ssrn.com/
abstract_id=3085632) (noting that copyright allows some artists to sell reproductions of
their works).
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B. From Private Property to Intellectual Property:
Authenticity as a Substitute for Copyright
Considering that visual artists do not need copyright law, why
does the law provide such a protection to creators? To better
understand how different types of creators use different legal
mechanisms, and why some of them rely primarily on private
property law while others depend mostly on copyright law
protection, this section introduces the notion of authenticity. This
concept, which will play an important role throughout this Article,
significantly impacts both the economics of creativity and the legal
framework that supports it.
If visual artists can make a living without relying on copyright,
can the same be said about other creators? Can J. K. Rowling follow
in Picasso’s footsteps? Can she buy materials—a notepad and ink
or a laptop—invest her talent and time in creating an artistic
artifact—a manuscript—in which she will certainly have personal
property rights, and sell that artifact to cover her costs? The answer
is, unfortunately, no. In a non-IP world, most book authors would
likely not be able to cover their fixed costs,87 even when the social
value of their work outweighs those costs.
There is a fundamental difference between a Pablo Picasso
painting and a J. K. Rowling manuscript. Consumers get to enjoy
Rowling’s work by reading copies of it while they get to enjoy
Picasso’s work by examining the original artifact that was created
by Picasso. A copy of Picasso’s work that was created by others,
even if visually identical, is considered a poor substitute for
Picasso’s work, as it lacks authenticity—a concept that plays a
significant role in the art world and in this Article.88

87. Rub, supra note 18, at 5.
88. For a discussion on authenticity in legal scholarship, see sources cited supra note

32. While the discussion of authenticity in legal scholarship is limited, the topic receives
significant attention outside of legal scholarship. See, e.g., MEGAN ALDRICH ET AL., ART AND
AUTHENTICITY (Megan Aldrich & Jos Hackforth-Jones eds., 2012); DAVID A. SCOTT, ART:
AUTHENTICITY, RESTORATION, FORGERY (2016); RICHARD TODD, THE THING ITSELF: ON THE
SEARCH FOR AUTHENTICITY (2008); WALTER BENJAMIN, THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF
MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION (1935), reprinted in ILLUMINATIONS 217 (Hannah Arendt ed.,
Harry Zohn trans., 1968) (1955).
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Consider, for example, the alleged actions of Tatiana Khan.
Khan, a gallery owner in Los Angeles, paid $1,000 to commission
from an unknown local artist a copy of a famous Picasso drawing.89
Khan then presented this copy as an authentic Picasso, which
allowed her to claim it was worth $4–5 million. She sold it for a
“bargain” price of $2 million. Neither the buyer nor his experts
noticed it was not an authentic Picasso. The forgery was discovered
years later.90
The story demonstrates how economically valuable
authenticity is.91 The market for fine work can contain both a
$4,000,000 authentic Picasso drawing and a $1000 visually identical
copy because there is little substitution between the two. Buyers in
this market perceive those two works as completely different. As
the notorious forger Han van Meegeren noted after being caught,
“Yesterday this picture was worth millions of guilders, and experts
and art lovers would come from all over the world and pay to see
it. Today it is worth nothing, and nobody would cross the street to
see it for free.”92 The famous art critic Martin Gayford noted that
“Discovering a work is a fake is like discovering a friend has been
lying to you for years.”93

89. The details about the story are taken from the federal criminal complaint that was
filed against Khan. Complaint, United States v. Khan., No. 10-0030M, 2010 WL 326207 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 7, 2010).
90. Id.
91. This Article takes consumers’ preferences as a given. Therefore, it does not focus
on why we consume visual art by observing original artifacts in museums while we are
satisfied with consuming non-original copies of books (as well as music, movies, and more).
This question is left to future work. Moreover, the Article focuses on the current reality. The
significance of “copying” and “authenticity” can and does change over time. The music
industry, for example, saw a gradual decrease in income from selling copies—albums and
tracks—while it experienced a significant increase in income from live performances. GLYNN
LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS 173 (2018). Live performances, much like a Picasso painting,
are authentic and cannot be replicated by third parties, which makes them mostly immune
to piracy. Technology also plays a crucial role. Indeed, it is possible that buyers would be
indifferent between original authentic work and a good-quality copy, but creating those
copies is not technically feasible. That was, for example, the state of the book industry before
the invention of the printing press. Therefore, it is not surprising that copyright law was not
needed and did not exist at the time. Peter K. Yu, Of Monks, Medieval Scribes, and Middlemen,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1. It is possible, therefore, that preferences, including preferences
concerning visual art consumption, will change over time.
92. MAGNUS MAGNUSSON, FAKERS, FORGERS AND PHONEYS 93–94 (2006).
93. Martin Gayford, Art Forgeries: Does It Matter if You Can’t Spot an Original?,
TELEGRAPH (June 17, 2010, 1:59 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/art-features
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This “aura of authenticity,” as Walter Benjamin famously called
is why Picasso does not need copyright. If the relevant market
attributes the value of an artifact to the identity of the person who
created it, then all a creator needs are personal property rights in
that artifact, together with legal protection against forgeries (i.e., a
prohibition on fraud). Because Pablo Picasso was the only one who
could have created authentic Picassos and because only authentic
Picassos can be sold for millions of dollars, the mere ownership
interest in the tangible creation allowed Picasso to extract much of
the value of his work from his buyers.95
Books, as well as many other forms of creativity, operate under
a different economic reality and employ a different business model.
I elsewhere called it a “multi-copies business model.”96 The concept
of authenticity, for the most part,97 does not exist when it comes to
books. Consumers of books—readers—are typically quite satisfied
with copies. The fact that J.K. Rowling did not personally create a
certain copy of Harry Potter does not significantly detract from the
value the reader places on it.
The fact that copies of the manuscript of Harry Potter are close
to perfect substitutes for the manuscript itself has an enormous
it,94

/7824999/Art-forgeries-does-it-matter-if-you-cant-spot-an-original.html (discussing an
exhibition about famous art forgeries at the National Gallery in London). Stories of art
forgery are not rare. The history of fine art includes multiple examples of works that were
purchased for a small fortune and later turned out to be forged or fake, which caused them
to lose practically all their value. The stories of art forgers incite the imagination of authors
and have been the subject of multiple movies, books, and articles, from Orson Welles’s last
movie F for Fake to the successful TV series White Collar. See also Leila A. Amineddoleh, Are
You Faux Real? An Examination of Art Forgery and the Legal Tools Protecting Art Collectors, 34
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 59, 92–97 (2016) (exploring famous art forgeries in recent decades).
94. BENJAMIN, supra note 88, at 220; see also Adler, supra note 32, at 344.
95. Authenticity, however, is a vague notion that can be subject to multiple meanings.
As Laura Heymann points out, we use the word in various contexts—from “authentic Italian
sauce,” to “authentic Napa Valley wine,” to an authentic folk singer, to “an authentic
Rembrandt.” Heymann, supra note 32, at 29–32. In each of those contexts, the meaning of the
word authentic is different. At best, we can hope that the term has a stable meaning within a
certain context, but even that is not always the case. An authentic Van Gogh painting is
understood to mean a painting that was physically painted, from scratch to finish, by Van
Gogh. But an “authentic Warhol” might have been painted by someone working at Andy
Warhol’s studio, maybe under Warhol’s supervision. For the purpose of this Article, it is
enough to note that while this uncertainty exists at the margin, nobody will perceive the
work of a forger that has nothing to do with the artist as an authentic work of the artist.
96. Rub, supra note 18, at 4.
97. Authentic items in this model might have value as collectors’ items. However, that
value, even if it exists, pales in comparison to that of the copies of the work. Rub, supra
note 18, at 4.
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impact on the market in which authors operate. On the one hand,
it allows many more readers to access the work. Thus, this feature,
which economists call non-rivalry in consumption,98 has the
potential to be a great source of social good. On the other hand, the
fact that it is possible to create almost perfect substitutes through
copying means that the social value of an author’s creativity is
detached from the value of the manuscript. In other words, the
social value of the work is misaligned with personal property law.
Even in a world with well-developed and well-enforced personal
property rights, practically all book authors will not be able to
generate significant income from their rights in tangible artifacts:
that is, the manuscripts they create. Those authors—unlike
carpenters and painters—should not decide whether to stay or
leave the market based on the value of those physical goods.
This is a market failure—one that economists call a public
goods failure99—that copyright law mitigates.100 If authors’ rights
were limited to personal property rights—that is, if they had rights
over their manuscripts, but not over the creation of copies thereof—
they could have recovered only a tiny fraction of the social value of
their creation. The market will, therefore, under-incentivize their
creation, and too many potential authors will either leave the
market or not enter it in the first place. Copyright law addresses
this failure by creating a legal exclusivity over the creation of
copies.101 This exclusivity allows authors to earn income under the
multiple-copies business model.

98. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–17 (1962).
99. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610–11 (1982).
100. Id. The fact that visual artists do not need copyright led some to argue that
copyright law discriminates against them. See, e.g., Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for
Artists: An Analysis of the Register of Copyrights’ Report, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 395, 403
(1992). Shockingly, a few years ago, the U.S. Copyright Office joined that faulty logic. U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE ROYALTIES: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS 1, 31 (2013), https://
www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf. As I discussed elsewhere,
Rub, supra note 18, at 3–7, and as further clarified in this section, this argument misstates the
role of copyright in mitigating market failures concerning some types of creativity.
Naturally, copyright does not need to fix what is not broken. Fine artists do not need
copyright, because they do not suffer from the market failures that harm other creators.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2018) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . .
to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . .”).

1169

001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/5/20 9:52 PM

2019

C. Using Intellectual Property Law to Exercise Post-Sale Control
The previous section suggests that visual artists who create
authentic tangible work rely primarily on their personal property
ownership interest in the tangible items they create. Their main
source of income is the sale of those tangible items, such as
paintings and sculptures—not copyright. Nevertheless, copyright
subsists in their works.102 What role does it play?
For relatively few artists, copyright is used to earn income by
controlling massive commercialization of their works: from
merchandise that incorporates Andy Warhol’s or Keith Haring’s
work to posters presenting those of Pablo Picasso or Salvador Dali.
Such commercialization requires a license to reproduce the work
from the artists (or their heirs), and it thus generates income.
Nevertheless, very few artists generate significant revenue from
mass commercialization, and for most of them this is a relatively
minor source of income compared to the proceeds from the sale
of their works.103
Copyright, however, is sometimes used as a tool of post-sale
control over the use of artworks. When an artist creates a tangible
artifact—that is, when the work is fixed—it is typically protected
by copyright.104 However, when the object is first sold, much of the
copyright in the work is extinguished. Specifically, the copyright
owner’s rights to control the distribution of the artifact and its
public display are exhausted and cannot be exercised.105 In other
words, once a painting or a sculpture is sold, the owner of the
artifact is free to transfer it to others and to display it publicly
without the authorization of the artist.106
Nevertheless, the exclusive right to reproduce the work is not
exhausted by the sale of an artifact.107 Presenting the work of art
that was purchased does not require reproduction, but presenting

102. Id. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
103. See supra note 86.
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
105. Id. § 109(a), (c); see also infra Section IV.C (discussing how contemporary
art challenges the principles of copyright exhaustion and how that affects our
notion of ownership).
106. Rub, supra note 48, at 749–50.
107. See Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi, Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 657 (2d Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2760 (2019).
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the work in another medium—such as in a catalog or on a
museum’s website—involves reproduction and therefore might
require a license.108
In addition to the artists’ economic rights under the Copyright
Act, they are entitled to certain moral rights under the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).109 Those nontransferable rights
of attribution and integrity are designed to protect the artist’s
personal noneconomic interests.110 They thus create an ongoing
connection between artists and their works.
The attribution right gives artists a cause of action when their
names are used in connection with works that either they did not
create111 or were distorted or mutilated in a way that would harm
the artists’ honor or reputation.112 The integrity right creates a cause
of action under certain circumstances when the work is being
distorted or destroyed.113 Together, those rights raise the possibility
108. It is not obvious that a license is indeed needed. The purchaser of an artwork and
any subsequent purchaser can rely on two main theories in arguing that a license is not
needed. First, the sale of the artifact might be considered to include an implied nonexclusive
license from the artist to the buyer to reproduce the work in a way that is incidental to the
ownership of the artifact. See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775–76 (7th Cir. 1996)
(explaining how a copyright owner might be considered to grant an implied license in similar
circumstances). This argument is not without doubts, partly because of a circular rejoinder:
the fact that many museums believe that they need a license, and that they spend significant
resources entering explicit contracts with artists regarding the reproduction of their works,
might suggest that a license should not be typically implied.
Second, a museum might claim that creating a copy for a catalog or a website is fair
use. Determining if a use is fair hinges on a four-factor test, as codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107.
The first factor, the purpose and character of the use, can cut both ways. On the one hand,
the use is, at best, only borderline transformative. On the other hand, museums are typically
nonprofit institutes. The second factor, the nature of the work, and the third, the amount
used, will probably support the finding of infringement because the works are protected by
copyright and, in many cases, being copied in their entirety. Finally, the fourth factor, the
market harm to the copyright holder—which is likely “the single most important” one,
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)—will likely
strongly support fair use. The presentation of works on websites or catalogues is no
substitute for the work and does not harm the artist’s income stream. This is, of course, a
simplified analysis of the complex question of fair use, but it indicates that museums’ fair
use claims are strong although not guaranteed to prevail.
To the best of my knowledge, those issues were never fully litigated. But see Teter v.
Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (considering a gallery’s possible
implied license to present an image of the artist’s works on its website; in that case, however,
the artist and the gallery had a long-term relationship, including several explicit agreements).
109. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 was codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
110. Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(B).
112. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
113. Id. § 106A(a)(3).
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that handling works without the artists’ consent might violate
their moral rights.
While these cases are not common, artists do, from time to time,
sue museums, galleries, and collectors to enforce their post-sale
moral rights when their works are allegedly harmed. For example,
in 2011, Sotheby’s planned to auction a 1990 print on aluminum by
Cady Noland, titled Cowboys Milking. Noland was at the time (and
until recently) the most commercially successful living female artist
in the world.114 Unfortunately, at some point before the work came
into Sotheby’s possession, its four corners were slightly bent. Upon
discovering this, Noland, through her lawyer, contacted Sotheby’s
and claimed that the work had been distorted in a way that would
be prejudicial to her honor and reputation.115 Sotheby’s then
withdrew the work.116 Similarly, in 2007, the Swiss contemporary
artist Christoph Büchel and the Massachusetts Museum of
Contemporary Art (MASS MoCA) sued each other. The dispute
revolved around a massive installment of Büchel’s work, titled
Training Ground for Democracy. According to the museum, Büchel’s
requirements concerning the installation were unreasonable, but
when the museum decided to present parts of the work without the
artist’s approval, the parties ended up in court.117 Even less wellknown artists sometimes file VARA lawsuits. In 2014, for example,
Jomar Statkun successfully sued a gallery for cropping one of his
paintings at the request of a buyer.118
Those isolated cases might create the wrong impression. This
type of VARA litigation is relatively rare, and winning is difficult.

114. Jason Daley, Jenny Saville Takes Title of Most Expensive Living Female Artist,
SMITHSONIAN MAG.: SMARTNEWS (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/jenny-saville-becomes-most-expensive-living-female-artist-180970497.
115. Marc Jancou Fine Art Ltd. v. Sotheby’s, Inc., No. 650316/2012, 2012 WL 7964120
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 2012).
116. The owner of the work later sued Sotheby’s for breach of contract and Noland for
tortious interference in a contractual relationship. The court dismissed the claim because the
contract with Sotheby’s allowed it to withdraw the work if “there is doubt as to its
authenticity” and because of “Noland’s assertion of her right under VARA . . . there was
more than ‘doubt’ as to attribution.” Id.
117. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 42–46 (1st
Cir. 2010). The parties settled after the First Circuit allowed part of Büchel’s suit to proceed
to trial. See Training Ground for Democracy, MASS MOCA (Dec. 7, 2010), https://
massmoca.org/event/training-ground-democracy.
118. Statkun v. Klemens Gasser & Tanja Grunert, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5570(LAK), 2014 WL
1383849 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014).

1172

001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1147

8/5/20 9:52 PM

Owning Nothingness

VARA is narrow in scope. It only applies to living artists119 and only
if their work is protected by copyright.120 Works that are not
protected by copyright, such as the conceptual artworks that this
Article focuses on, are therefore automatically excluded from
VARA protection. Moreover, VARA is designed to protect only fine
art, and therefore it excludes many works that are protected by
copyright.121 In addition, the rights it provides are narrow and
subject to multiple defenses. For example, modifications that are
the result of “the passage of time” or the result of conservation are
immune from liability under VARA unless, in the case of
conservation, it is done in gross negligence.122 On top of the legal
limitations, the rarity of those formal legal proceedings makes them
salient, and therefore they can entail significant reputational harm
for the parties involved.123
Overall, the combination of the right of reproduction
under copyright law and the moral rights under VARA allows
artists to control some limited aspects concerning the post-sale use
of their works. As further discussed below in section III.B, the social
norms of the art world grant artists different and mostly broader
post-sale rights.
D. Legal (Non)Protection of Conceptual Art
Part I of this Article explores one of the main innovative
features of the conceptual art movement: emphasizing ideas that
119. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (2018).
120. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 302 (7th Cir. 2011).
121. VARA protection is limited to only artists who created a “work of visual art.”

VARA defines that term narrowly in an attempt to cover only fine art. 17 U.S.C. § 101. That
narrow definition excludes many copyrighted works from VARA protection. This limitation,
while significant to some creators, such as photographers, is less relevant to the visual artists
whose interests are at the heart of this Article. For them, as fine artists, if their work is
protected by copyright (and in many cases it is not), it is likely protected by VARA as well.
122. Id. § 106A(c)(1)–(2).
123. For example, Cady Noland’s reputation as an artist who aggressively enforces her
alleged post-sale rights affects the market for her work. When Scott Mueller, a businessman
and an art collector affiliated with the Cleveland Museum of Art, purchased her work, titled
Log Cabin, in 2014, he insisted on including a provision in the purchase agreement that would
allow him to return the work for a full refund of the purchase price ($1.4 million) if Noland
ever disowns the work. The details of this arrangement became public when Noland did just
that: disowned the work. See Mueller v. Michael Janssen Gallery Pte. Ltd., 225 F. Supp. 3d
201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Similarly, the clash between Christoph Büchel and MASS MoCA is
well known in the art world, and some industry insiders I interviewed commented
negatively on both parties to this dispute.
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can be simply executed instead of technical artistic craftsmanship,
and even dematerialization, where artists do not create tangible
objects at all. Sections A through C of this Part detail how private
property law and copyright law work in tandem to protect and
incentivize creativity. This section analyzes the tension between the
two. It suggests that dematerialized conceptual artworks do not fit
the legal framework and, as such, they evade legal protection. They
are, this section maintains, a legal nothingness.
First, consider the importance that conceptual art attributes to
ideas and concepts at the expense of their technical expressions.
Such a shift, which can be traced to the readymade movement,124
challenges the hidden assumptions upon which our legal
framework for protecting and incentivizing creativity rely. Take,
for example, the following description by Sol LeWitt, one of the
most important conceptual artists of the twentieth century:
In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect
of the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means
that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and
the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine
that makes the art. . . . It is usually free from the dependence on
the skill of the artist as a craftsman.125

This statement undermines an important hidden assumption
in copyright law. Like many other artists, including Duchamp
and Gonzalez-Torres, LeWitt places the entire value of the work in
its “idea or concept.” But both ideas and concepts are mentioned
explicitly in the Copyright Act as outside the subject matter
of protection.126
Copyright, instead, protects the execution of the ideas and
concepts. The law’s hidden assumption is that the value of the work
is found primarily in its execution. But conceptual artists keep the
execution intentionally simple—“a perfunctory affair” as LeWitt
put it. However, those who are engaged in this “perfunctory
affair”—expressing the idea—are those who copyright law

124. See supra text accompanying notes 59–65.
125. LeWitt, supra note 66, at 80 (footnote omitted); see also GODFREY, supra note 53, at 4

(“Conceptual art is not about forms or materials, but about ideas and meanings.”).
126. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection . . . extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
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considers authors.127 Authors are the ones who are granted
copyright protection, whether or not they used ideas that were
created and developed by others.128 Moreover, if an artist’s work
lacks copyright protection, it is also not subject to moral rights,129
and thus the artist cannot exercise any legal post-sale control over
the use of her work.
Nevertheless, as long as the artist produces a tangible object,
her private property rights in that object and the “aura of
authenticity” it possesses will compensate the artist for her creative
labor. Indeed, even if the tangible objects are too simple to be
protected by copyright, the value of the work can be extracted from
the unique authentic object created by the artist.130

127. See infra Section IV.C.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work . . . vests initially in the author . . . .”).

The distinction between unprotected ideas and protected expressions is one of the most
complex notions in copyright law, and a full analysis thereof is beyond the scope of this
work. It is, however, important to note that although “expression” and “execution” are
closely related, they are not synonymous. There could be cases in which an artist will come
up with an idea—as the term is commonly used—but the idea will be detailed enough to be
considered an expression, as the term is understood in copyright law. In fact, some of
Sol LeWitt’s works might fit that mold, as they include very detailed instructions regarding
the execution. If those instructions include the artistic choices that copyright considers
expressions, which they arguably do, see Peter J. Karol, The Threat of Termination in a
Dematerialized Art Market, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 187, 188–90 (2017), then LeWitt’s
instructions are a copyright-protected expression.
On the other hand, copyright law does not protect a work if it expresses an idea that
can only be expressed in a few ways. In that case, the idea and the expression are considered
merged, which makes the work unprotected. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014). That rule likely applies to many readymade and conceptual artworks.
Because of their simple execution, there are likely limited ways to express the idea behind
such works. For example, the execution of a work such as Fountain is so trivial that it might
not be protected by copyright, and thus free for others to copy.
129. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
130. This was true with respect to the “authentic” readymade works, which were sold
for hefty sums a century ago, and it is still true nowadays when it comes to conceptual artists
who produce tangible objects. Damien Hirst, for example, one of the richest living artists in
the world, produces such work. His The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone
Living—showing a shark in a tank of steel and glass—was sold for about $12 million in 2004.
Carol Vogel, Swimming with Famous Dead Sharks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/arts/design/01voge.html. Another one of his works—
Lullaby Spring—featuring a ten-foot steel cabinet with more than 6,000 pills, was sold for
$19.2 million in 2007. Pernilla Holmes, The Branding of Damien Hirst, ARTNEWS (Oct. 1, 2007),
http://www.artnews.com/2007/10/01/the-branding-of-damien-hirst/. Indeed, whether
or not Hirst’s works are protected by copyright, his ownership rights over the objects he
creates allow him to make a fortune from his creativity. Carol Vogel, Art Sales Put London in
Catbird Seat (and New York on Notice), N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2007), http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/06/25/arts/design/25auct.html.
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But dematerialized artworks cannot even enjoy that source of
income. Those artists who create dematerialized art, that is, pure
ideas, do not produce any tangible item, and so there is no authentic
object that they own once the work is completed. Without a tangible
object, there are obviously no private property rights in the work.
Consider, for example, Felix Gonzales-Torres’s “Untitled”
(Portrait of Ross in L.A.), discussed above. It seems to escape all
forms of legal protection.131 The work is not protected by copyright,
because the idea of having 175 pounds of colorful candies on the
floor is exactly that—an idea—and ideas are not protected by
copyright. The elements that can, maybe, be protected by
copyright—the creative choices concerning the expression of the
idea—are not only trivial but were not made by Gonzalez-Torres.
The exact choice of colors, the shape of the arrangement, and its size
are not dictated by Gonzalez-Torres’s instructions and are left to
the individual, typically a curator, who is setting up the exhibit. For
example, below are several installations of the same work—
“Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.).132

131. This Article focuses on the two main legal rights that artists have: personal
property rights in the artifacts they create and copyright. It explains that conceptual artists
that create dematerialized works cannot rely on any of those rights. One can consider other
legal claims that conceptual artists might assert if a museum presents the artists’ works, such
as those that are based on trademark, unfair competition, fraud, right of publicity, unjust
enrichment, and more. It is doubtful that any of those theories can prevent a museum from
presenting an unauthorized dematerialized art, such as “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.).
For example, suing a museum for such use under the Lanham Act would be quite
challenging. Conceptual art does not fit well within the definition of a mark under the Act,
as this is not how we typically think of trademarks (which identify goods), service marks
(which identify services), collective marks (which certify a certain origin or quality), or
collective marks (which indicate membership in an organization). 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
Moreover, the Supreme Court read the relevant provisions of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a), narrowly, and explicitly rejected the argument that when it comes to a
communicative product, such as a book or novel, trademark law protects the origin of the
work itself and not just the origin of the physical object in which the work is fixed. Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003). The Court stressed that
such a protection can be achieved only through the Copyright Act and “once
the . . . copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the . . . work at will and without
attribution[,]” id. at 33–34, and that Congress chose to regulate the right of attribution with
the enactment of VARA and not by the Lanham Act, id. at 34–35. A full analysis of artists’
rights under the Lanham Act and other causes of action is beyond the scope of this Article.
132. As a practical matter, whether or not the curators’ contribution meets the legal
requirement for copyrightability, curators and museums do not seek protection for the
arrangement of conceptual artworks. Those who I spoke with found this notion strange and
even offensive. See also infra Section IV.B.

1176

001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1147

8/5/20 9:52 PM

Owning Nothingness

Copyright law focuses on the expression of ideas and on the
elements that together constitute that expression—such as shapes,
colors, and arrangements.133 Infringement analysis of threedimensional works, for example, considers whether the works are
substantially similar—that is, whether their protected elements
look alike. Specifically, the judge or jury examines the expressive
elements of the works in question and not the ideas behind them.134
Therefore, the copyright-protected elements in this work, if there
are any, do not belong to Gonzalez-Torres, but to the individual,
the curator, who made those artistic choices. Moreover, as the
pictures above demonstrate, various installations of “Untitled”
(Portrait of Ross in L.A.) may look different. Therefore, and although
the art world treats them as the same work, they are, as far as
copyright law is concerned, different works: a rectangle of candies,
a pyramid of candies, and a circle of candies.
Indeed, by defining the work by its ideas, and by treating the
expressive elements as nothing more than “a perfunctory affair”

133. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
134. Kaminski & Rub, supra note 42, at 1119–20 (exploring how copyright law applies

the various substantial similarity tests).

1177

001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/5/20 9:52 PM

2019

that is left for the curator to execute, Gonzalez-Torres’s creativity is
made unsuitable for copyright protection.135
Gonzalez-Torres also cannot rely on personal property law,
because he did not create the tangible objects that are being
presented. While Duchamp purchased the urinal and the pedestal
and physically created Fountain, Gonzalez-Torres did not do
anything similar. He did not create any object. Even if he created
the first installment of the work, that installment—those 175
pounds of candies—is long gone. It was eradicated the first time the
work was presented and visitors took those candies from it. If no
tangible object that was created by the artist survived the first
installation of the work, then no object can be subject to personal
property rights.
This is the legal nothingness. Putting aside patent law, which is
irrelevant in this case,136 public ideas simply cannot be subject to
legal protection. The law does not recognize any property right
with respect to those ideas.137 As such, from a legal perspective,
they cannot be owned, sold, or bought.
If no form of legal mechanism protects Gonzalez-Torres’s work,
then how can society incentivize the creation of those pure ideas
that form dematerialized art? More specifically, how can Gonzalez-

135. There are other legal obstacles to copyright protection for some works by
conceptual artists. For example, the tendency of conceptual artists to use unorthodox
materials might challenge copyright law’s notion of fixation. If, for example, the artist uses
materials that change over time, such as flowers, one might argue that this ever-changing
work is not fixed, and therefore it is not subject to copyright protection. See Kelley v. Chi.
Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the “Wildflower Works” by the
famous artist Chapman Kelley is not protected by copyright because a living garden does
not meet the fixation requirement); cf. Zahr K. Said, Copyright’s Illogical Exclusion of Conceptual
Art, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 335 (2016) (arguing that conceptual artworks, including Kelley’s
work, satisfy the fixation requirement). For the arguments set forth by Professor Said, I find
the Kelley court’s reasoning unconvincing. However, the issue discussed in this section in
connection to Gonzalez-Torres’s works has nothing to do with the fixation requirement.
See Said, supra, at 354 (“There may be many sound reasons to exclude conceptual art from
copyright protection, perhaps chief among them that, often, conceptual art is driven by a
concept, or idea, which copyright law remains committed to excluding.”).
136. While patent law can protect more abstract ideas, those are protected only if they
meet the requirement of patentability, and in particular if they are useful, novel, and
nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018). This is part of the law’s overall balance that reserves
the strongest form of protection—which extends to ideas—to the newest and most pathbreaking works. In this case, it is quite obvious that Gonzalez-Torres’s works cannot be
protected by patents, as they are not useful and probably cannot meet any of the other
requirements for patentability.
137. See also infra Section IV.A.
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Torres, and artists like him, earn a living? The answer lies primarily
in the social norms of the art world. Those norms and their effects
are the subject matter of the next Part of this Article.
III. FROM NOTHING TO SOMETHING:
THE SOCIAL NORMS OF THE ART WORLD
The previous Part explained how conceptual art challenges the
legal framework for protecting and incentivizing creativity.
Conceptual artists create powerful works that consist of pure ideas.
Those works are not protected by either personal property rights or
copyright. Therefore, as far as the law is concerned, those works
cannot be subject to any type of property rights: they are nothing.
Moreover, many of those works are intentionally simple, and
therefore copying them would be very quick and easy. Indeed, no
legal norm prevents a museum from buying 175 pounds of
individually wrapped candies in multicolor cellophane and
presenting them as a work of art. Considering that such a work will
be visually identical to any other Felix Gonzalez-Torres
installations, why should museums not do so? In other words, what
rights do creators of dematerialized artworks have?
While the law does not arm conceptual artists with legal rights,
the social norms in the art industry step in and fill this gap.138
138. To explore those social norms and the rights they create, I reviewed dozens of
published interviews with industry insiders and studied industry publications and websites.
In addition, I conducted my own interviews. I interviewed thirteen industry insiders,
including curators, museums’ and galleries’ senior administrators, and collection managers.
When allowed, I also reviewed legal documents, such as contracts their institutions entered
into. My interviewees were affiliated with ten different institutes, including private
collections; large public galleries; and small, medium, and large museums, including one of
the twenty largest museums in the world (measured, as is the industry practice, by the size
of the gallery space). Four of the institutes are located in New York, three in Ohio, and three
in Israel. The relevant Israeli law is substantially similar to American law. Specifically, they
both do not protect public ideas. I used my personal connections to secure some of those
interviews. In addition, I asked each of my interviewees to recommend and connect me with
others I should speak to, which proved to be the most fruitful way to secure interviews.
Many of my interviewees also recommended other written materials that would assist me in
this study. Three of the interviews were held over the phone and the rest in person. All the
in-person interviews were held, at my interviewees’ request, at the art institute with which
they were affiliated. To encourage open and informal conversation, I did not record any of
my interviews but took detailed notes during the conversations and immediately thereafter.
The shortest interview lasted twenty-five minutes and the longest more than two and a half
hours. On average, each interview lasted about an hour and a half. To encourage my
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In fact, a close examination of those social norms, which this Part
provides, shows that the social norms create a scheme that, in many
respects, resembles the core framework of the legal protection of
creativity. Indeed, while the legal system grants Picasso both
private property rights and copyright in his paintings, the social
norms of the art world arm him with somewhat parallel rights.
The social norms of the art world grant an ownership interest
to artists in their creations, whether or not that ownership interest
is legally recognized. The social norms bestow ownership-like
interest over legal nothingness. This Article calls that interest pseudo
personal property rights. Like legally recognized private property
rights, pseudo rights can be bought and sold. Selling their pseudo
ownership interest provides artists with a valuable source of
income. Section A discusses those norms.
On top of pseudo personal property rights, artists also enjoy
broadly recognized and partly nontransferable rights to control
certain aspects regarding the work after it is sold. Those rights
include a right to be consulted and affect the use of their work, as
well as a related right to determine the authenticity of work that is
allegedly theirs. Indeed, the art world recognizes an ongoing
connection between the work and the artist who created it. That
connection is sometimes parallel to copyright law, but, as this Part
explains, the contours of the social norms are different and typically
broader than the legal norms. Those social norms, which apply
even when the law does not provide the artists any post-sale rights,
are explored in section B below.
Section C discusses other aspects of the social norms of the art
world. It focuses on the degree of flexibility that those norms entail,
as well as their varying impacts in different contexts.
A. Pseudo Property Rights over Legal Nothingness
Paintings, like any other tangible artifacts, typically have
owners. They can be bought, sold, gifted, or loaned. Intangible
rights in paintings—that is, copyright—can also be owned and
subject to their own set of standard transactions: buying, selling,

interviewees to be candid, I promised them (as well as The Ohio State University’s Office of
Responsible Research Practices, which approved this study) to not identify any of them by
their name or by the name of their affiliated institute.
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gifting, licensing, and more. As a legal matter, public ideas139—for
example, dematerialized artworks—are not subject to property
rights, and therefore transactions in those ideas are meaningless.
The art world, however, considers the artists of all works of art,
including works that consist of pure ideas, to initially have
property-like rights in their works.
Take, for example, Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s work, discussed
in section I.C., “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.). Multiple leading
fine art websites and publications state that the work is located at
the Art Institute of Chicago.140 The website of the Art Institute
of Chicago states that the work is a “[p]romised gift of Donna and
Howard Stone.”141 The Smithsonian’s website suggests that the
work is “on extended loan from Donna and Howard Stone.”142 The
Chicago Tribune’s art section similarly suggested that the work “has
been on loan to the Art Institute for the last few years.”143
In November 2015, ArtNews reported that another candy-based
work of Felix Gonzalez-Torres, titled “Untitled” (L.A.), was “sold
last week at Christie’s postwar and contemporary evening
sale for $7,669,000.”144
Those descriptions raise multiple questions: What does it mean
that this type of work—in essence, an idea—is located somewhere?
What exactly is located there? What does it mean to gift or to loan
it? A loan typically includes a temporary transfer of possession,
139. Private ideas can likely be subject to property rights under the law of ideas. See
infra notes 224–29 and accompanying text. However, the law of ideas is inapplicable to public
ideas, such as those whose implementations are presented at the MoMA. See infra notes
229–30 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Hide/Seek: “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) by Felix Gonzalez-Torres,
NAT’L PORTRAIT GALLERY, https://www.si.edu/es/object/yt_37bSb-aQ4BM?width=85%
25&height=85%25&iframe=true&destination=spotlight/frederick-johnson-photographs
(last visited Feb. 19, 2020); “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), WIKIART (Oct. 9, 2012),
https://www.wikiart.org/en/felix-gonzalez-torres/untitled-portrait-of-ross-in-l-a-1991.
141. Description of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), ART INST. CHI. (emphasis added),
http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/152961 (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
142. Hide/Seek: Portraits by Felix Gonzalez-Torres and David Wojnarowicz, NAT’L PORTRAIT
GALLERY (emphasis added), https://www.si.edu/es/object/yt_4iiLMJru7SY (last visited
Feb. 19, 2020).
143. Lisa Stein, What a Concept, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 22, 2000) (emphasis added),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-10-22/news/0010220318_1_art-instituteconceptual-art-new-museum.
144. Hannah Ghorashi, Crystal Bridges Museum Acquires Record-Setting Work by Felix
Gonzalez-Torres, ARTNEWS (Nov. 16, 2015, 5:01 PM) (emphasis added), https://www.
artnews.com/art-news/market/crystal-bridges-museum-acquires-record-setting-work-byfelix-gonzalez-torres-5359/.
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but here there is none. So what is being loaned? And what did the
buyer of the work get in return for almost $8 million? As far as the
law is concerned, the answer to all those questions is nothing.
Those descriptions are meaningless. Indeed, only by treating the
pure idea as the equivalent of an object could those statements start
to make sense.
This materialization of pure ideas does not stop here. Museums
commonly enter loan agreements concerning those works. One
such agreement that I was allowed to review during my study,
concerning a dematerialized Felix Gonzalez-Torres work, is titled
“Borrower’s Agreement.” In it, the “owner” of the work states that
it “will be pleased to lend” the work to a museum for a specific
period of time. The same document, nevertheless, mentions that
“there is no object to lend in this case.”
The social norms of the art world go well beyond the mere
symbolism of property rights.145 The art world actually treats those
intangible dematerialized works as physical artifacts. Most notably,
the art world treats them as rivalrous goods, and it thus creates
artificial scarcity, uniqueness, and value. The next paragraphs
explain those impacts in greater detail.
Most tangible goods, from cars and chairs to paintings and
manuscripts, are rivalrous, in the sense that their consumption by
one prevents or limits the consumption by another.146 Intangible
goods, like ideas, are an example of non-rivalrous goods, where the
consumption by one person does not limit consumption by
another.147 Without the art world’s social norms, “Untitled” (Portrait
of Ross in L.A.) would have been non-rivalrous. Everyone, including
every museum, could have presented and enjoyed the work
simultaneously: buy 175 pounds of colorful candy and present it
according to the well-known simple directions that were originally
set forth by Felix Gonzalez-Torres.
But doing so would be inconsistent with the social norms of this
industry. According to those norms, there is only one “Untitled”

145. See also infra text accompanying note 162.
146. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons

Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 945–46 (2005).
147. Id.

1182

001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1147

8/5/20 9:52 PM

Owning Nothingness

(Portrait of Ross in L.A.).148 The work is “owned” by Donna and
Howard Stone and “kept,” on a long-term “loan,” by the Art
Institute of Chicago.149 That work was “purchased” from Felix
Gonzalez-Torres and was “transferred” from one owner to another
until it was “purchased” by the current owners in 1997.150 Those
owners, like the owners of tangible items, can “loan” the work to
others. In the case of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), the
“owners” did just that.151 The truly crucial aspect of this norm is
148. Not every dematerialized work exists in just one copy. When the artist creates a
work, she can decide how many copies of it may exist at any given time. Thus, an artist may
decide that at any given time there will be five copies of the work, which, as far as the art
world is concerned, means that the artist created and can sell five works. See, e.g., Taylor,
supra note 5 (explaining how a conceptual work titled Comedian was sold to three separate
buyers). Purchasers are, of course, informed before buying whether the work is unique and,
if not, how many copies of it will exist at any given time. Some of them require the artist to
contractually promise not to sell more instances of the work. Unique works, however, are
typically significantly more expensive. This practice does not undermine the core
observation and argument made in this section: every authorized copy of a work, even a
pure idea, must originally be purchased from the artist who came up with that idea.
149. Description of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), supra note 141.
150. Id.
151. Id. It should be noted that there is one tangible item that the purchasers of a
dematerialized work sometimes get: a certificate of authorship. That document is sometimes
signed by the artist and includes the instructions for installing the work. Some artists even
require the purchasers of their works (i.e., the purchasers of the pseudo personal property
rights) to sign the certificate, allegedly creating a contract. Joan Kee, Félix González-Torres on
Contracts, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 519 (2017).
However, the importance of the physical certificate itself should not be overstated.
Suggesting that the certificate is the work that museums are paying millions for seems
unreasonable. Cf. Martha Buskirk, Public Experience/Private Authority, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 469, 475 (2017) (discussing a lawsuit, which quickly settled, by a collector against a
gallery that lost a certificate of authenticity). First, from a legal perspective, those certificates
have limited value. Their main source of power is rooted in the social norms of the industry
and not with legal limitations on the use of the work. Even if some of those certificates are
contracts, which is not without doubts, they are obviously not easements and they do not
create property rights that legally bind downstream buyers and third parties (e.g., other
museums). In other words, as a purely legal matter, no certificate can prevent a museum, or
anyone else who did not sign the certificate, from presenting a candy-based work of
Felix González-Torres. Cf. Peter J. Karol, Permissive Certificates: Collectors of Art as Collectors of
Permissions, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1175 (2019) (considering the legal impact of certain certificates
of authenticity).
Second, my impression from discussing the matter with industry insiders is that the
certificates themselves have limited power even as far as the social norms are concerned.
Dematerialized works are being “loaned” routinely without any change in the possession of
their certificates. Borrowing agreements that I reviewed included the instructions for the
installation but not the certificates. Most of my interviewees, including those who routinely
engaged in loaning and borrowing conceptual art, never saw a certificate. Some told me that
even when they buy art it is mostly unaccompanied by a certificate. Others told me that their
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that my interviewees stressed time and again that a museum would
never present an installation of the work without receiving
permission from the pseudo-owner. That permission is typically in
the form of a “borrowing” agreement. Because this right of the
artists and their purchasers is respected by the entire art world, it is
de facto a right against the world—a pseudo property right.
This last point is worth stressing because it is the heart of this
entire ecosystem. In my conversations with industry insiders, some
of whom work for large museums and some for smaller institutes,
I repeatedly asked if they would ever consider presenting one of
Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s dematerialized works “on their own”
without contacting the “owner.” Most of my interviewees could
barely understand the question. I explained that they could easily
purchase 175 pounds of candies and present it in exactly the way
that Gonzales-Torres intended. With no exception, all my
interviewees told me, in one way or another, that what I was asking
them to consider was “to create and present a forgery, which we
would never do.” Some interviewees called such actions
“piracy.”152 Most of them could not imagine that any museum or
gallery would ever deviate from this norm. Some of them said that
if any institute presents “unauthorized” work, the reputational
harm will be immense, and nobody will take that institute seriously
or want to transact with it.
Because museums and galleries refuse to present “Untitled”
(Portrait of Ross in L.A.) unless it is “on loan” from the work’s
certificate certifies that their installation of a work is consistent with the artist’s vision, which
means that the certificate is not transferable.
I asked my interviewees what would happen if an original certificate were lost. They
noted that if that happens, which is unlikely, it would not hurt the “authenticity” of the work.
In other words, if the Crystal Bridges Museum loses the certificate of authenticity concerning
“Untitled” (L.A.), a work that cost it almost $8 million, the art world would still perceive the
museum as the owner of the work.
It should be noted, however, that most of my interviewees work in museums, and
museums, with minor and rare exceptions, do not sell their art. Therefore, one cannot rule
out that a different population, one that engaged more routinely in selling and buying
artworks (as opposed to loaning and presenting them) would place greater weight on
certificates of authenticity.
152. One of my interviewees, however, stated that he does not consider it piracy or
morally problematic. But when I asked him if his institute would ever consider presenting
such a work without a borrowing agreement, he noted they would not because the
reputational backlash would be severe, especially from the institute who “owns” the
work. He explained that “that institute, and others, will not work with us in the future if
we do that.”

1184

001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1147

8/5/20 9:52 PM

Owning Nothingness

pseudo-owner, there is at most only one copy of the work presented
at any given time. Artificial scarcity is thus the natural result of this
social norm.
That artificial scarcity gives the artist a powerful and valuable
property-like right. Because the artist is the initial pseudo-owner of
the work, she can sell that right (i.e., the work). As the buyer knows
that after the sale she will be the only one who is considered
authorized to present the work, she is willing to pay for her
exclusive rights.153 This reality puts all visual artists, whether they
create tangible artifacts or pure ideas, on equal footing.
B. Post-Sale Artistic Control
Part II explains that our legal system protects creativity
through both private property law and copyright law. But visual
artists who create unique, authentic, tangible works typically do
not rely on copyright licensing as their main source of income.
Instead, those artists primarily use copyright’s right of
reproduction together with VARA’s moral rights as a way to
control the post-sale use of their works.154 That control is, however,
quite narrow in scope, as it is subject to multiple defenses and
limiting principles.155 Artists who create pure ideas (i.e.,
dematerialized works) do not get copyright or moral rights in their
creations—which are legal nothingness—and therefore cannot
exercise any legal post-sale control.
The social norms of the art world, however, designate a central
place for artists when it comes to decisions concerning the post-sale
use of their works. This section explores those social norms.

153. Sonia Katyal recently compared Gonzalez-Torres works to public goods. Because
of their “endless nature” and because viewers are invited to take pieces of the works, they
resemble non-rivalrous goods. Sonia K. Katyal, The Public Good in Poetic Justice, 26 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 497, 500–01 (2017). This is an interesting observation, although it does not
consider the social norms of the art world. Those norms transform the works into rivalrous
private goods. Gonzalez-Torres and his Foundation were well aware, see, e.g., infra text
accompanying note 156, of those norms and enjoyed the financial benefits that are the result
of the artificially created scarcity.
154. See supra Section II.C.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 108, 119–22.
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1. The legal post-sale control rhetoric
While the law does not allow artists who create dematerialized
art to control the art’s post-sale use, the art world uses legal
terminology, often inaccurately, to signal the artists’ ongoing rights
over certain aspects of their work.
Consider, for example, Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s candy-based
works. The Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation’s website, which
until recently included references to dozens of dematerialized
works, stated that it “holds the copyright in and to all works by
Gonzalez-Torres.”156 Although many of those works are actually
not protected by copyright, the art world accepts the Foundation’s
copyright-like interest in those works.
Industry websites routinely include a form of copyright notice
when referring to or presenting Gonzalez-Torres’s candy works.
On its webpage dedicated to “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.),
the Art Institute of Chicago states “© The Felix Gonzalez-Torres
Foundation.”157 The Guggenheim Museum has an identical
copyright notice on its webpage dedicated to another candy-based
work of Gonzalez-Torres, which the museum recently had on
display.158 The Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York
includes a similar notice on its webpage dedicated to another
Gonzalez-Torres candy-based work: “© 2020 The Felix GonzalezTorres Foundation.”159
From a legal perspective, those copyright notices are quite
preposterous. First and foremost, as discussed above, the “work”
in all those instances is an idea that is not protected by copyright.160
Second, the notice itself only looks like a copyright notice, but it
does not meet the legal requirement of such notices. A copyright
notice must include, alongside the symbol ©, the “year of first
publication” and the name of the copyright owner.161 The notices

156. Copyright,
FELIX
GONZALEZ-TORRES
FOUND.,
http://felixgonzaleztorresfoundation.org/?page_id=56 (last visited Oct. 24, 2018) (at the time of editing of this
Article, the foundation’s website is under construction and unavailable).
157. Description of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), supra note 141.
158. Description of “Untitled” (Public Opinion), GUGGENHEIM, https://www.
guggenheim.org/artwork/1512 (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
159. Description of “Untitled” (USA Today), MOMA, https://www.moma.org/
collection/works/81073 (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 131–34.
161. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b) (2018).
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on the websites of the Art Institute of Chicago and the Guggenheim
Museum do not include a year of publication, while the one on
MoMA’s website lists the year 2020, which is obviously not the year
of first publication. It is surprisingly easy to find similar mistakes
in other museum websites and printed publications. Luckily, even
if those works were protected by copyright—and they are not—
since 1988, a copyright notice is no longer a requirement for
copyright protection.162
The repeated use of legal terminology is peculiar, and it is
unclear whether this is just an error, an assumption—unverified
and mistaken—that the law must follow the industry practice, or
an attempt to inject legal symbolism into a non-legal system of
norms. In my interviews with industry insiders, I tried to explore
whether they know that there is a gap between copyright law and
their use of copyright terminology and copyright notices. The
answers were often unsatisfactory and vague. Some of my
interviewees clearly did not know about the gap and for them it
was a mistake, others (including some with significant experience
in copyright law) said that they “didn’t think about it before,” and
others noted that for them the exact nature of copyright legal norms
is not crucial or that using the copyright terminology “is something
that the [artist] wanted us to do.”
The common thread in the answers I received is that my
interviewees did not question the copyright-like terminology that
they were used to applying. As such, it seems that for the art world
as a whole, the legal cover might help strengthen and support the
social norms. With those terms, the art world signals that it
acknowledges a long-lasting link between visual artists, and even
their estates and foundations, and the works they created. The
remainder of this section explores the nature of that link and the
rights that artists—conceptual and non-conceptual—have over
their sold works.
2. The norm of consultation
It is a common practice for museums and galleries to contact
artists or their estates and foundations to get their views and

162. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat.
2853, 2857 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2018)).
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eventually their permission for an exhibition. That permission
process typically includes conversations about the nature and
format of the exhibit, how the artists and their work are going to
be presented, and the supporting materials that are going to be
produced in connection therewith, such as the exhibit’s catalog
and webpage.
The main motivation for this practice, besides the (relatively
small) litigation risk,163 is artistic. The industry insiders I
interviewed expressed a desire to “do the best by the artist and the
work” by preserving the intentions of the artist. Many museums
have established clear policies to foster a form of dialogue between
their curators and other administrators and artists. The Museum of
Contemporary Art in Chicago, for example, sends all artists whose
work it considers exhibiting a questionnaire that documents their
desires regarding the way to present their works.164 Other
museums collect that information when they purchase a work, and
sometimes they also request that the artist consent in advance to
future use that is consistent with such information.
Museums and galleries are especially interested in having the
artists’ views when they need to exercise greater discretion.
Curators I spoke with were willing to openly discuss their
discretion as to what exhibits to have and what works to include
therein, but they often minimized their role in choosing how a
specific work is presented. To them, their role in executing the work
was insignificant and likely meaningless.
Exhibiting installations of dematerialized art requires greater
discretion, and it is therefore not surprising that curators are
typically interested in the artists’ views when it comes to those
works. Stephanie Skestos, a curator at the Art Institute of Chicago,
noted that “[w]henever the Art Institute installs any kind of art, we
want it to be installed the way the artist intended . . . . With
conceptual pieces sometimes it’s hard to nail that down.”165
Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s works are especially challenging for
curators. The instructions for many of his works are intentionally

163. See supra Section II.C.
164. Stein, supra note 143.
165. Id. Interestingly, there is clear tension between the curators’ fascination with

artistic intent and conceptual artists’ desire not to explain their works and let others,
including curators and viewers, interpret it. See supra note 80.
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vague.166 Gonzalez-Torres thus invites the curators of his exhibits
to exercise discretion when installing them. But curators, for the
most part, would rather not make those judgment calls. Elena
Filipovic, who curated several exhibitions of Gonzalez-Torres’s
works, described the need to make those decisions as no less than
“devastating.”167 Andrea Rosen, Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s former
gallerist, the executor of his will, and the president of his
Foundation, commented on that phenomenon from the other
perspective: that of the artist or, in this case, his Foundation. She
noted that while the Foundation records how Felix GonzalezTorres’s works are presented by museums and galleries, it does not
maintain a “record[] of what the rules are, even though institutions
would like us to do this.”168
In some cases, the artist or his estate requires the presenting
museum to take actions that are more than mere consultation. For
example, some of Sol LeWitt’s works include instructions as to how
to execute a drawing. But my interviewees explained that, unlike
Felix Gonzalez-Torres, LeWitt in his lifetime and, after his death,
his estate, require that those instructions be executed by someone
from a narrow list of “qualified” painters—most of whom worked
with LeWitt in his lifetime. This requirement is backed up by all the
social norms this Article discusses: The pseudo-owner of the work
will refuse to loan it to a museum unless it follows those
instructions. Not following them might make the installment
considered inauthentic or “forged” by the art world.
Another common situation in which industry insiders feel that
it is important to consult the artist is when the work needs to be
conserved.169 Conservation and restoration typically entail
discretion, and the art world perceives it as vital that the artist’s
intent is not replaced or even undermined by those who restore the
work. As Samantha Sheesley explained: “A work of art is fully
realized and completed when encountered by and interpreted by a

166. See FILIPOVIC ET AL., supra note 73, at 12.
167. See id. at 19.
168. Interview: Andrea Rosen & Tino Sehgal, in FILOPOVIC ET AL., supra note 73, at 395; see

also Kee, supra note 151, at 518 (commenting on the desire of institutions to receive significant
guidelines when installing Felix Gonzalez-Torres works); Katyal, supra note 153, at 505
(describing how Gonzalez-Torres insisted on not providing detailed installation instructions
even when museums asked him to do so).
169. See supra Section II.C.
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viewer. . . . When the interpreter of an artwork is a conservator,
false impressions can lead to misguided practice.”170 Museums,
therefore, spend significant resources trying to guarantee that the
artist’s intent is preserved, which, in the case of a living or recently
deceased artist, includes consulting with the artist or their
foundation or estate. One museum insider told me that her institute
would not conserve any work of a living artist without the artist’s
explicit consent. In one case, after a work was mutilated by a visitor,
the museum contacted the artist, who stated that he would rather
the work be left mutilated—a request that the museum honored.171
Museums and galleries nowadays take the consultation norm a
step further, in that they carefully document the artist’s intent
regardless of their current use of the work. They conduct detailed
interviews with the artist, sometimes as early as they purchase the
work, and inquire how exactly the work is to be preserved and
presented in the future. Those interviews are typically recorded to
make sure that the artists’ accounts are as accurate as possible.172
The art world values consulting with artists because it is
broadly believed that artists are in the best position to present and
maintain the intent behind a work, and that this intent is what the
exhibit-goers should be exposed to. Museums and galleries are
happy to spend the resources involved in this process partly
because they know that others in the art world are spending those
resources as well. In that way, this norm preserves the quality of
artistic works for generations to come. Artists and their foundations
are regarded as the stewards of authenticity. Indeed, the norm of
consultation and the norm of authentication, discussed
immediately below, are tightly connected. In some respects, they
are two sides of the same coin.

170. Samantha Sheesley, Artist Interviews as Tools for Diligent Conservation Practice,
17 TEXTILE SPECIALTY GROUP POSTPRINTS 107, 107 (2007).
171. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2018) (“[M]odification of a work of visual art which is
the result of conservation . . . is not [actionable] unless the modification is caused by gross
negligence.”); see also infra text accompanying note 181.
172. Glenn Wharton, INCCA: A Model for Conserving Contemporary Art, GETTY
CONSERVATION INST., http://www.getty.edu/conservation/publications_resources/newsletters/
24_2/incca.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
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3. The norm of authentication
The second post-sale right that the social norms in the art world
give visual artists is the right to significantly affect which works are
considered authentic and which are not.173 As discussed in section
I.B, authenticity is a central concept in the art world. There is a
broad consensus that collectors, museums, and galleries should
refrain from purchasing or presenting any work that is not
authentic. The artist’s position has a tremendous effect on the
perception of a work as authentic or not and, therefore, on its value.
Artists can obviously declare that a work is simply a forgery: a
work—a tangible artifact—that seems to be theirs but was actually
created by someone else. Experienced industry insiders often
contact artists, or their foundations and estates, requesting that the
authenticity of a work be confirmed or refuted. Many foundations
form “authentication boards” to conduct this very task.174 In 2012,
for example, Leslie Hindman Auctioneers, a leading auction house
based in Chicago, contacted the famous contemporary painter
Peter Doig to verify that a work it was about to auction was indeed
his. Doig, through his attorney, denied that it was his painting, and
the auction house refused to auction it.175 The painting immediately
lost practically all of its value—$7 million by one estimate.176
The ability of artists to disown their works is broader than
either the right to announce that a work is forged or the legal right
of attribution under VARA. Artists, for example, sometimes
disown their works because they were allegedly distorted or
modified to their dissatisfaction. Those modifications are typically
the result of a failure to maintain the condition of the work or a
failed attempt—at least failed from the artist’s perspective—to
conserve the work.
173. This right can also be called a right of attribution, as artists get the power to decide
which works can be attributed to them and which cannot. I chose to call it a right of
authentication to not confuse it with the right of attribution under VARA. Supra text
accompanying note 111. As further explained below, those two rights are related but
not identical.
174. Fincham, supra note 32, at 594. The role of those boards is complex and, in some
extreme cases, they can even create a liability risk for the foundation. Id. at 604–08. A full
analysis of the work of those boards is beyond the scope of this work.
175. Fletcher v. Doig, 125 F. Supp. 3d 697, 704–05 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
176. Andrea Rush, Fletcher v. Doig: A Case of Refuted Authorship and a Role for Alternative
Dispute Resolution, WIPO MAG. (Feb. 2017), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/
2017/01/article_0007.html.
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In recent years, the renowned conceptual artist Cady Noland
disowned two of her works because of their conditions. As
mentioned above, in 2011 she disowned her print on aluminum
titled Cowboys Milking, because its corners were slightly bent.177 In
2014, she disowned her work Log Cabin, because the gallery that
owned the work replaced some of the wooden logs that formed the
piece with identical logs once the old logs started to rot.178 In both
cases, while Noland took legal actions, she did not need to sue to
disown the work and materially affect its value. Disowning
Cowboys Milking only required her to notify Sotheby’s, and the latter
refused to auction it.179 Disowning Log Cabin required only a public
announcement, which caused the buyer of the work to cancel the
transaction and return the item to the seller.
It is quite doubtful that Noland had legal recourse in any of
those cases. VARA exempts damage “which is a result of the
passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials.”180 It is quite
likely that the damage to Cowboys Milking was caused by “the
passage of time” as well as the nature of the aluminum, a soft metal,
that Noland used to create it, which means that there would not be
any liability for this damage. VARA also exempts damage that is
the result of conservation, unless it was caused by gross
negligence.181 This likely means that the owner of Log Cabin did not
infringe on Noland’s moral rights.182
Indeed, VARA plays a limited role in this ecosystem.183
Regardless of her legal rights, the mere fact that Noland does not
perceive those works as hers anymore is enough for much of the art
177. See supra text accompanying note 115.
178. See supra note 123.
179. Noland contacted Sotheby’s through her lawyer, see supra text accompanying note

116. However, as discussed below, infra text accompanying notes 180–82, Sotheby’s
acceptance of Noland’s demands was likely not rooted only in her legal rights.
180. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1) (2018).
181. Id. § 106A(c)(2).
182. This question might be litigated as part of the complaint that Noland filed against
the gallery that restored her work. However, on June 1, 2020, the District Court dismissed
Noland's complaint on different grounds. Noland v. Janssen, No. 17-CV-5452 (JPO), 2020 WL
2836464 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020). At the time of writing, it is unclear whether Noland will
appeal this decision.
183. Daniel Grant, Artistic Paternity: When and How Artists Can Disavow Their Work,
OBSERVER (July 28, 2016, 10:17 AM), https://observer.com/2016/07/artistic-paternitywhen-and-how-artists-can-disavow-their-work/ (comparing the limitation on liability
under VARA to the artists’ ability to disown their work by noting that “[t]he right to disclaim
authorship, however, has fewer impediments”).
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world to consider them inauthentic, which drastically diminishes
their value.184
Artists can disown their works for an even simpler reason: they
just do not like them anymore or believe that they no longer
represent their artistic vision. Consider, for example, the case of
Richard Prince, who is considered by some to be the most
important artist since Andy Warhol.185 In 1988, Prince disowned all
his work created before the late 1970s. He noted that he had
destroyed all works from that period that were in his possession
and stated that he does not regard works from that period as
representing his vision, stating that “I didn’t like the work I did 10
or so years ago.”186 Prince’s website, as well as the website of his
leading dealer, Barbara Gladstone, do not list a single work or
exhibit before 1979, when he was thirty years old.187
Many in the art world—although, as further discussed below,
not everyone—respect Prince’s wishes. The Guggenheim
Museum’s website, for example, dates Prince’s career from 1980 on
and does not list any work or style of his before the late 1970s.188
The Whitney Museum of American Art, which staged the last
retrospective of Prince in 1992, did not include in it a single early
work by the artist.189 Nancy Spector, a current curator at the
Guggenheim who put together the Prince retrospective, stated that
the museum “tend[s] to respect the artist’s wishes” when selecting
works for an exhibition.190 The Walker Art Center in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, which owns several of Prince’s works from that early
era, agreed to lend them to others, but it will not present those

184. See id. (“The audience for disclaiming authorship of an artwork is not just its
current owner but future buyers who may be dissuaded from purchasing something that the
artist claims has been distorted or mutilated.”).
185. See, e.g., Carol Vogel, For Those Who Can Afford It, Christie’s Is Selling Anxiety, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 26 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/arts/design/a-christiescontemporary-art-auction-with-an-edge.html.
186. Daniel Grant, Can Artists Really Disown Their Early Work?, HUFFPOST (Aug. 11,
2010, 7:49 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-grant/can-artists-really-disown_
b_678184.html.
187. RICHARD PRINCE, http://www.richardprince.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2020);
Biography of Richard Prince, GLADSTONE GALLERY, https://gladstonegallery.com/
artist/richard-prince/biography (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
188. Richard Prince, GUGGENHEIM, https://www.guggenheim.org/artwork/artist/
richard-prince (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
189. Grant, supra note 186.
190. Id.

1193

001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/5/20 9:52 PM

2019

works at the museum. Siri Engberg, its curator, explained that
“[i]t’s important to maintain a close relationship with the artist.”191
She noted that “[t]he gesture of disavowal may be a way [for the
artist] to regain . . . control [of their work]” and to signal that some
of the artist’s works are “not part of an artist’s conceptual plan.”192
In 2017 Richard Prince did it again, although for a slightly
different reason. In January, just days before the inauguration of
then President-elect Donald Trump, he disowned a work he created
for Ivanka Trump. Prince disowned the work by calling it “fake”
and returning the payment, $36,000, he received for it.193 Prince
stated that disowning the work was an act of protest against the
Trump family.194
Richard Prince is, of course, not the only prominent artist
to disown his prior works that were no longer to his liking.
Additional examples include Pablo Picasso, who disowned a
painting he allegedly drew as a “joke”;195 Gerhard Richter, the
abstract artist, who—much like Prince—disowned his early and
more realistic works;196 and even Felix Gonzalez-Torres, who
disowned several works he created, calling them “additional
material” and “non-works.”197
C. The Flexibility of Social Norms
Social norms are typically characterized by their potential for
flexibility, if the industry participants choose to make them so.198
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Randy Kennedy, Richard Prince, Protesting Trump, Returns Art Payment, N.Y. TIMES

(Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/arts/design/richard-princeprotesting-trump-returns-art-payment.html.
194. Id.
195. Grant, supra note 183.
196. Fincham, supra note 32, at 594.
197. Grant, supra note 186.
198. Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and
Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 21 (2000) (“Social norms have the advantages of
flexibility . . . .”). Legal norms can offer some flexibility too—for example, by using more
standard-based norms and fewer rule-based norms. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 (1985) (explaining that flexibility is a virtue of legal
standards). In the context of copyright law, for example, the law achieves flexibility primarily
through the fair use defense. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163
(9th Cir. 2007) (“We must be flexible in applying a fair use analysis.”); Gordon, supra note 99,
at 1637 (“[T]he case-by-case flexibility of fair use allows the courts to weigh the value
criterion in defendant’s favor only when they do feel equipped to make such judgments.”).
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When it comes to its social norms, the art world shows flexibility
regarding flexibility. Some norms, in particular those that resemble
private property rights, show little flexibility. As noted above, I was
unable to find an instance where a museum or a gallery exhibited a
work, including a work that is a pure idea, without “owning” or
“borrowing” it.199 Nor did any of my interviewees know of such an
example. Those norms do not seem to have any exception.
The norms regarding the artists’ post-sale control, on the other
hand, are flexible, which makes the industry significantly more
adaptable and susceptible to nuances than copyright law. Indeed,
the norms of consultation and authentication are not always
accepted and followed. While the art world rarely wholly ignores
the artists’ desires, some are willing to take actions that are
inconsistent with those wishes, especially when they are difficult to
assess accurately or when they seem unreasonable.
One important aspect of this flexibility has to do with works by
deceased artists. When individuals die, most of their legal rights
pass to their heirs. Their heirs can, and sometimes do, exercise those
rights in a way that is inconsistent with the desire of the deceased.200
Copyright is an example of a legal right that heirs can fully exercise
as they desire, regardless of the deceased’s wishes.201 The heirs’
power does not diminish or disappear as long as copyright lasts,
which is currently seventy years after the death of the author.202
This means that in many cases the rights will be transferred several
times, including to those who probably never met the author.
The social norms of the art world work differently. Museums
try to preserve the artist’s intent, but when it comes to deceased
199. See supra text accompanying note 151.
200. Property law includes legal mechanisms that are designed to curtail what is

commonly referred to as “dead-hand control.” See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36,
42 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Property law disfavors restraints on alienation and dead-hand control by
prior owners.”). The most famous of those mechanisms is probably the rule against
perpetuities. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control,
64 TUL. L. REV. 705, 718–20 (1990).
201. See, e.g., Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2015) (allowing
the heirs of Ray Charles to use their rights under the Copyright Act although that use
circumvented the artist’s clear and expressed intent); cf. Andrew Gilden, IP, R.I.P., 95 WASH.
U. L. REV. 639 (2017) (exploring various interests that the estate of deceased artists might
promote).
202. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012); see also Ariel Katz, Substitution and Schumpeterian Effects
over the Life Cycle of Copyrighted Works, 49 JURIMETRICS 113 (2009) (suggesting that copyright
protection should be stronger shortly after the work is created and weaker later on).
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artists, assessing that intent becomes more complex. The identity of
the legal heir of the artist plays relatively little role in this process.
Instead, museums seek input from individuals who should be most
familiar with the artist. Ideally, artists leave behind foundations
that are managed by those who knew them and their work during
their lifetime. The artist’s former gallerists, dealers, and others who
worked in the artist’s studios are valuable sources whose advice
might be sought by presenting museums. But, in sharp contrast
with copyright law, the social norms that require consultation with
the artist’s foundation and former colleagues weaken over time
and, in some circumstances, might eventually disappear. Industry
insiders explain that they consult with an artist’s foundation or
former colleagues because they are best positioned to know the
artist’s intent. However, they also note that as those individuals
retire or die, museums take a greater role in deciding for themselves
how to express the artist’s intent.203 Similarly, over time, the role of
the artist’s circle of acquaintances in authenticating a work is
diminished as museums take a more significant role in this process,
by, inter alia, maintaining documentation regarding the
provenance of their works.204 In other words, unlike copyright law,
the artistic post-sale control does not have a preset fixed term.
This flexibility is not limited to deceased artists. Many industry
insiders I spoke with are familiar with examples of museums that
did not receive permission from an artist to exhibit a work, and
even cases in which an exhibition presented a work against the

203. When it comes to conceptual art, the discussion regarding the diminished role of
the artists’ foundations and heirs is looming, but still mostly theoretical. Conceptual art
started to gain momentum in the late 1960s, which means that many leading conceptual
artists are still alive or recently deceased. Therefore, their foundations and estates are still
managed by those who knew them. This reality, however, will unavoidably change in the
years to come.
204. See Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275,
360 (1982) (“Museums have a mission to help the search for truth about the art they possess.
That mission entails searching for and acquiring as much information about provenance as
possible . . . .”); Ronald D. Spencer & Judith Wallace, Museums and Museum Curators: Caught
in the Cross-Hairs of Authenticity Disputes, in THE LEGAL GUIDE FOR MUSEUM PROFESSIONALS
27, 32 (Julia Courtney ed., 2015) (explaining how foundations gradually stop dealing with
authentication requests, partly because of liability risk, and how “[t]his leaves a void that
museum curators may be asked to fill”).
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artist’s desire.205 In some of those cases, the lack of permission
required the museum to refrain from using an image of the artist’s
work in its supporting materials, such as its website. Many industry
insiders are familiar with examples, which are apparently rare but
somewhat salient, of permissions that were denied, which led to the
cancellation of an entire exhibition at great harm, both financially
and to the reputation of the parties involved.
Somewhat similarly, while some prominent museums refrain
from presenting works that artists disowned because of their
dislike of their old works, other museums are willing to exhibit
them. In 2007, for example, the Neuberger Museum of Art at
Purchase, New York, arranged an exhibit titled “Fugitive Artist:
The Early Work of Richard Prince, 1974–77.”206 As the name
suggests, that exhibit presented Richard Prince’s disowned works
from the mid-1970s. Prince, of course, refused to cooperate in this
exhibit, which limited the museum’s ability to use images of the
work in its catalogs.207 The exhibition, nevertheless, was well
received by the art world.208 Other museums, such as the Walker
Art Center, which refrains from presenting Prince’s disowned
works, were willing to loan them to be exhibited elsewhere.209 The
industry insiders I spoke with found this issue difficult. Some of
them noted that they think it is “in poor taste” to present a
disowned work, although others said that “you can only disown a
work you did not sell by destroying it.” Some stated that if their
museum owned a disowned work it would just store it, while
others suggested that lending it to third parties would be

205. See, e.g., Kate Taylor, National Portrait Gallery Rejects Artist’s Request to Remove His
Work, N.Y. TIMES: ARTSBEAT (Dec. 20, 2010, 2:20 PM), https://artsbeat.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/12/20/national-portrait-gallery-rejects-artists-request-to-remove-hiswork/ (reporting on how the National Portrait Gallery in Washington refused to remove a
work by AA Bronson from an existing exhibition). Bronson asked for his work to be removed
after the museum’s highly criticized decision to censor a work by another artist, David
Wojnarowicz. Id. The lender of Bronson’s work, the National Gallery of Canada, publicly
supported the artist’s request and urged the Washington museum to respect it, but the
National Portrait Gallery refused. Id.
206. The exhibit was covered by leading publications such as the New York Times
Art and Design section. Roberta Smith, Tracing a Radical’s Progress, Without Any Help
from Him, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/09/arts/
design/09prin.html.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Grant, supra note 186.
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acceptable, and yet others noted that they would be willing to
present it with a clear indication that the artist disowned the work.
The market for disowned artworks similarly shows the
complexity of the issue. The market treatment of disowned works
varies and depends on the circumstances that led to the artist’s
decision. If there is any doubt as to whether an artist created a work,
the large auction houses will refuse to sell it.210 Several large auction
houses refused to sell works that were disowned because the artists
were displeased by their state, such as Cady Noland’s work
Cowboys Milking.211
On the other hand, the resistance to selling disowned art is
much weaker when it is the result of the artist’s changed taste.
Sotheby’s and Christie’s, for example, agreed to sell Richard
Prince’s early works, even though they were disowned.212 The
effect of the act of disowning on the market price of the work is
similarly ambiguous. It is likely that, in most cases, disowning a
work reduces its value.213 On the other hand, the act of disowning
art may, under some circumstances, arm the work with additional
meaning, which might even raise its price. For example, Joshua
Holdeman, the former vice chairman of Sotheby’s, noted that
Richard Prince’s disowned print of Ivanka Trump “will probably

210. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 175 (explaining that as soon as Peter Doig
denied that a work was created by him, the auction houses refused to sell it). In some cases,
probably not common, there could be doubts whether the artist is considered the one who
created the work. For example, Andy Warhol routinely supervised works that were created
by others in his studio and later signed them. The Andy Warhol Foundation typically
considers those to be Warhol’s and they are sold as such. However, the Andy Warhol
Authentication Board, appointed by the Andy Warhol Foundation, refused to authenticate
several such works that were later, nevertheless, included in his official catalogue raisonné,
which is typically also controlled by the Foundation. The auction houses consider those to
be Warhol works and sold them as such. See Heymann, supra note 32, at 38–39. Those actions
and the authentication policies of the Andy Warhol Foundation were subject to a bitter
lawsuit. See Fincham, supra note 32, at 605–06.
211. See supra text accompanying note 115.
212. Grant, supra note 186.
213. For example, Andrea Rosen, the president of the Felix Gonzalez-Torres
Foundation, referred to Gonzales-Torres’s disowned works by acknowledging that they are
being sold occasionally at auctions, but she also noted that “‘[t]hey sell for less’ than the
pieces the artist did view as constituting art.” Id. This phenomenon makes sense. As many
museums and industry insiders refuse to present disowned works, and as it is more difficult
to authenticate or exhibit them, the demand for them is lower.
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end up being a more culturally rich object than if this whole episode
[hadn’t] happened” and that it might increase in value.214
Finally, but importantly, in some respects, the scope of the
artists’ rights under the social norms is quite narrow, as they apply
to the artists’ work but not to closely similar works. My
interviewees mentioned that while they will never ignore pseudo
personal property rights (i.e., present a work they did not buy or
borrow), and while they typically consult with artists before
presenting their works, these norms only apply to the work itself.
If Bob creates a work that is inspired by and is very similar to Alice’s
work, then—as far as the social norms are concerned—Bob’s work
can be purchased or presented without consulting with Alice.215
Limiting the scope of an artist’s rights to her work alone and
excluding any rights over substantially similar works puts
the social norms of the art world in an interesting tension with the
corresponding legal norms. Legal rights over intangible property—
including copyright—are not limited to literal copying.
Judge Learned Hand famously observed that copyright “cannot be
limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations.”216 Under copyright law, if the defendant
copies protected elements of the plaintiff’s work, and if the
defendant’s work is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s work,
copyright is prima facie infringed.217
The social norms of the art world are different, as they perceive
two works by two artists, even if visually identical, to be different
from one another. One is an authentic work by one artist, and the
other an authentic work by another. Therefore, the permission
of one artist is not needed to use the work of another. The fine
artists also typically respect those norms and rarely sue other fine

214. Kennedy, supra note 193; see also August Brown, Banksy Pranks Auction by Shredding
Million-Dollar Painting. Now It May Be Worth Even More, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-cm-banksy-shreds-painting-20181006story.html (explaining that when Banksy, the famous street artist, publicly partly destroyed
one of his paintings he likely significantly increased its value by giving it a special meaning
in the history of fine art).
215. One curator cynically asked me when I inquired about this practice: “You know
that we have works by appropriation artists in this museum, right?” The curator was, of
course, referring to the tendency of appropriation artists to present works that are nearly
identical to the originals on which they are based.
216. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
217. Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2018).
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artists for creating works that are substantially similar to theirs,
even if those actions constitute copyright infringement.218 It is thus
not surprising that most of the litigated disputes surrounding
visual art in recent years concerned conflicts between
appropriation artists and individuals from outside the fine art
world, primarily photographers.219
***

218. Picasso and his estate, for example, do not engage in legal actions against dozens
of artists who create and present, in many cases without authorization, derivative works of
Picasso paintings. For example, the author recently attended an exhibit at Musée Picasso in
Paris that was dedicated to perhaps Picasso’s most famous work—Guernica. The original
work was on exhibit at Museo Reina Sofia in Madrid, but the museum in Paris presented
pictures of the work and a full-size engraving titled Garage Day Revisited by Damien
Deroubaix that was almost identical to the original work by Picasso. There is no doubt that
under copyright law Deroubaix’s work infringes the copyright in Guernica. But the art world,
including Musée Picasso, considers it an authentic, unproblematic work by Deroubaix.
Picasso’s estate, however, uses a different standard for those outside of the fine art
world. For example, it famously threatened to sue James Cameron, the producer of Titanic,
and was eventually paid licensing fees for including an image of Picasso’s Les Demoiselles
d’Avignon in the movie. Patricia Cohen, Art Is Long; Copyrights Can Even Be Longer, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/arts/design/artists-rights-societyvaga-and-intellectual-property.html. The motivation for the lawsuit was not purely
financial, as the Picasso estate wanted to punish the movie creators for falsely implying that
the work, which has been part of the permanent collection of the Museum of Modern Art in
New York for decades, was on board the Titanic and thus lost. Milton Esterow, The Battle for
Picasso’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Empire, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.
vanityfair.com/culture/2016/03/picasso-multi-billion-dollar-empire-battle.
219. Richard Prince was famously sued by the photographer Patrick Cariou for using
his photographs in an exhibition at the Gagosian Gallery in New York. Cariou v. Prince, 714
F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). Shortly after the Second Circuit’s decision, which held that most of
Prince’s works were fair use, Prince got himself in legal troubles again when, in 2014, he
exhibited copies of Instagram posts without permission. Four lawsuits—three from
photographers and one from a make-up artist—soon followed. Beatrice Kelly, The (Social)
Media is the Message: Theories of Liability for New Media Artists, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503,
505 (2017). Two of the complaints were settled. Kelly, supra. At the time of writing, the
proceedings in the two other cases are continuing.
Prince is not the only prominent contemporary artist who has been sued for using
copyrighted materials that were created by those who are not part of the fine art world. For
example, Jeff Koons, the most commercially successful living visual artist in the world, has
been sued multiple times for copyright infringement. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244
(2d Cir. 2006) (holding that Koons’s use of a fashion photograph was fair use); Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that Koons infringed the copyright in a
photograph); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding that Koons infringed the copyright of a graphic designer); see also Amy Adler, Fair
Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559 (2016) (exploring the application of the fair
use defense in copyright lawsuits against contemporary artists); Adler, supra note 32, at 361
(suggesting, after exploring the recent legal battles over fine art, that they are not needed for
the progress of art).
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To summarize: The social norms of the art world fill a gap that
the legal system creates. They attribute property-like rights to every
artwork, whether or not the law recognizes such rights, including
when the work is nothing more than an idea. In addition, they
allow all artists to exercise a certain level of post-sale control over
the use of their works. These norms create something—rights for
the artists—in legal nothingness.
IV. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF RIGHTS
OVER LEGAL NOTHINGNESS
The previous Part explores, in depth, the social norms of the art
world that allow artists to be compensated for and be involved in
the use of their works. Those norms apply whether or not
copyright, or any other legal norm, incentivizes or otherwise
protects those works. As such, the art world provides artists with
rights in legal nothingness. This Part discusses some of the
normative implications of those social norms.
Section A analyzes the impact of recognizing pseudo property
rights in all artworks, including pure ideas. The section compares
the social norms to the legal norms and argues that the social norms
incentivize idea creation in a relatively efficient way. Sections B and
C zoom out and suggest that the social norms of the art world shed
light on and put into question more general legal concepts. Section
B explains that the norms of the art world expose some of the
shortcomings of the legal notion of authorship, a cornerstone
concept in copyright law. Indeed, authorship, as currently applied
by courts, is built on a perception of creativity which is suitable to
some creative industries but not to others. The section suggests how
authorship can be revised by taking into account the richer account
of creativity that this Article explores.
Section C suggests that the art world perceives private property
ownership in a flexible way that is partly inconsistent with certain
legal notions and rules. Developments in the market and in existing
technology, like the emergence of the sharing economy, similarly
question existing property law norms. Therefore, the section
explains that it might be appropriate to reconsider certain aspects
in our legal norms concerning private property ownership.
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A. Incentivizing Ideas’ Creation Efficiently
The social norms of the art world recognize property-like
ownership in legal nothingness: that is, works consisting of pure
ideas. The immediate effect of those norms is to provide an answer
to the question this Article posed at the end of Part II: How do Felix
Gonzalez-Torres and artists like him earn a living from their
acclaimed dematerialized works? If artists are considered the
“owners” of the works they create, and if no art institute will
present that work without purchasing or borrowing it, then the
artists must be paid for their works. Indeed, this is the main source
of income of visual artists, including Gonzalez-Torres and other
artists who create pure-idea works.
This regime is especially effective because of the strongly
shared norms among industry insiders—collectors, museum
administrators, gallery owners, curators, and so on. Fine art is
mostly consumed through museums and galleries, which places
their curators and administrators in a strong gatekeeping position.
In other words, there is no de facto free entry into this market by
outsiders who disrespect the industry norms. It is mostly
impossible to bypass that ecosystem and the close-knit society of
individuals who foster and promote those social norms.
As a result, those social norms and the pseudo property
rights they create close a certain gap in the way that our
legal system incentivizes creativity. Creativity comes in many
forms. For our purposes, it is enough to note that individuals
can come up with creative ideas, execute ideas in creative ways,
or do both. Copyright protection, however, attaches only to
creative execution.220 In other words, if Alice comes up with a
creative idea and Bob executes it in a creative way, Bob’s creative
contribution is protected by copyright, but Alice’s is not.
Developing ideas, however, takes time and involves resources.
If ideas escape legal protection, how are ideas’ creators incentivized
to develop them? Often, the legal system indirectly incentivizes this
activity. First and foremost, in many cases, protecting the execution
also provides adequate incentive for ideas’ development. This is
especially true in the rather common case in which the same
individual comes up with both the idea and its execution, and when
220. See also supra note 128.
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the main value of the work is in that execution, while the idea
embodied therein is trivial.221 For example, the idea of painting the
sky over a village at night is not very creative or unique, but
Van Gogh’s execution of The Starry Night is considered one of the
greatest artworks in history. The idea of a battle between a young
hero who is learning the ways of the trade and an older, more
experienced villain is not particularly interesting or new, nor is the
idea about a group of youngsters learning to use their magic
powers.222 But J.K. Rowling’s expression of those ideas when she
wrote the Harry Potter books made her the most famous and the
richest author of our time.223 In those cases, leaving the ideas that
are expressed in The Starry Night or Harry Potter in the public
domain and making them free for others to take causes no real
harm to the creators’ income.
In other cases, if the idea is developed by one individual and
executed by another, the law can still incentivize ideas’ creation.
A host of legal doctrines, collectively called “the law of ideas,”
protect idea developers against the misappropriation of their
creativity.224 Most cases concerning the law of ideas revolve around
“idea submission” disputes. The defendant in those cases created a

221. The line between ideas and expression is of course blurry. See Oravec v. Sunny
Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is no bright line
separating the ideas conveyed by a work from the specific expression of those ideas.”); see
also supra note 128. This known difficult problem, however, does not affect the analysis in
this section and is beyond the scope of this work.
222. There are multiple examples of those ideas in popular works that predate Harry
Potter. The idea of fights between pure good and pure evil is at least as old as the Bible and
Greek mythology. In modern popular culture, that idea plays a major role in most comic
books. The idea of a group of youngsters who are learning to use their special powers is also
old and in modern times is expressed in such works as the X-Men series, Terry Pratchett’s
Discworld Series, and Jane Yolen’s Wizard’s Hall. The idea of combining the two is of course
not new either. The similarity in ideas between Star Wars and Harry Potter is well-known.
The important observation is, however, that copying ideas is not only a common practice,
but it typically does not significantly harm the market for the earlier work.
223. Karissa Giuliano & Sarah Whitten, The World’s First Billionaire Author Is Cashing In,
CNBC (July 31, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/31/the-worlds-first-billionaireauthor-is-cashing-in.html.
224. The term “law of ideas” was coined in Melville B. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S.
CAL. L. REV. 119 (1954). See also Robert C. Denicola, The New Law of Ideas, 28 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 195, 205 (2014) (“Idea creators have invoked a dazzling array of legal theories in their
attempts to stop unauthorized use, with varying degrees of success.”); Miller, supra note 23.
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final product—for example, a children’s toy,225 a movie,226 a TV
series,227 or a commercial campaign.228 However, the idea for those
endeavors allegedly originated from the plaintiff who did not
directly benefit from its commercialization. The law of ideas allows
the idea developers to recover the value of their contribution to the
final product. As a practical matter, the law of ideas, nevertheless,
protects only non-public ideas.229
This indirect incentivization scheme leaves out works whose
value primarily lies in the idea and not in its expression, such as
dematerialized conceptual artworks. Protecting their execution,
which is typically trivial,230 and leaving the most creative part
thereof—the idea—in the public domain for others to freely copy,
can significantly undermine the incentives to create those ideas.
This is where the social norms of the art world step in by
providing pseudo-ownership over public ideas. Indeed, this
regime seems to provide a sophisticated, effective, and, as we shall

225. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714 (7th Cir.
2003); Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2000).
226. See, e.g., Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 738
F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956).
227. See, e.g., Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, 683 F.3d 424, 436
(2d Cir. 2012); Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, 649 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
228. See, e.g., Wrench, L.L.C. v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 459 (6th Cir. 2001);
Garrido v. Burger King Corp., 558 So. 2d 79, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
229. Some of the limitations on the protection of public ideas are doctrinal. See, e.g.,
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“Information that is public
knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret.”); Nadel, 208
F.3d at 373, 378, 380 (Sotomayor, J.) (noting that “property-based” causes of action for
protection ideas, such as misappropriation of quasi-property rights or conversion, require
that the idea will be “novel in absolute terms” because the law “does not protect against the
use of that which is free and available to all”). Moreover, if the law of ideas would have
provided property-like protection for public ideas, it might have been preempted by the
Copyright Act. See, e.g., SCO Grp., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 879 F.3d 1062, 1080 (10th
Cir. 2018); GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG United States of Am., Inc., 836 F.3d 477, 488
(5th Cir. 2016).
Contracts, in theory, can regulate non-public ideas. But, in practice, relying on
contracts to protect public ideas entails a host of issues. It is possible that a contract over
public ideas might not be supported by consideration, especially if the idea is known to both
parties. Nadel, 208 F.3d at 380. In addition, a contracts plaintiff needs to prove privity, tackle
contractual defenses, such as unconscionability and public policy, and handle the
reputational harm involved in enforcing such an oppressive contract. See Guy A. Rub,
Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-Contract Conflict, 103 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1209–18
(2017) (exploring those limitations on contracts over information goods). Indeed, I am not
familiar with any proceedings in which a plaintiff tried, successfully or not, to use a contract
to prevent the use of publicly available and known ideas.
230. See supra Section I.B.
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see, an efficient way to fill this gap in our legal system. To use the
terminology set forth by Kal Raustiala and Chris Sprigman, the law
leaves a negative space in which it does not provide incentives for
creativity,231 and that space is then filled by the social norms’
pseudo personal property regime.
It is probably more efficient to have the gap in our current legal
framework filled by social norms rather than by any form of
creativity-protection property rights, especially copyright-like
rights over ideas.232 Indeed, as far as copyright law is concerned,
ideas need to stay free in the public domain.
231. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 38, at 1764 (explaining that the negative space is
“a substantial area of creativity into which copyright and patent do not penetrate and for
which trademark provides only very limited propertization”). Raustiala and Sprigman
studied the social norms of the world of fashion. In recent years, other scholars examined the
negative space in other industries. See, e.g., David Fagundes & Aaron Perzanowski, Clown
Eggs, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1313 (2019) (exploring the social norms that support the
decoration of egg clowns); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh
(Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up
Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008) (analyzing the social norms advancing the creation of
jokes); Zahr K. Said, Craft Beer and The Rising Tide Effect: An Empirical Study of Sharing and
Collaboration Among Seattle’s Craft Breweries, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 355 (2019) (studying
the norms among Seattle’s craft breweries).
The focus in this section, and the main focus of this Article, is on the operation of the
social norms of the art world in that negative space. However, this Article also clarifies that
the social norms of the art world are not limited to that negative space, and that they operate
even with respect to those parts of the art world that, unlike conceptual art, are subject to
legal norms, including intellectual property law. See, e.g., supra notes 216–19 and
accompanying text.
232. While the claims made in this section are important, one should not lose sight of
their limitations. The question that the rest of this section asks is whether property law,
especially copyright, can incentivize idea creation better than the industry currently does.
In other words, is a legal reform needed? It explains that the answer to both questions is no.
This, by itself, does not mean that the system of social norms, and in particular the pseudo
personal property regime, is perfect or costless. Cf. Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 38
(claiming that many scholars of social norms in creative industries compare them only to
fictional IP regimes, although they might raise other issues, including some that go beyond
IP law).
One can raise multiple questions regarding the overall desirability of the social norms
scheme that this Article describes. For example, is it possible that it provides too strong of
incentives? Such a phenomenon was studied in some industries. See, e.g., Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 419–24
(1997). Discovering the efficient level of incentives is not a simple question to answer. In
tackling such a question, it is important to keep in mind that the art world (like many other
industries in the 21st century) is not purely driven by market powers. The government
intervenes in the market in multiple ways, including, for example, direct financial support
to many museums and significant tax benefits to non-profit institutes, including practically
all museums.
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The relative efficiency of the social norms comes from the low
social costs that this form of protection entails. To appreciate the
likely superiority of the pseudo personal property regime, one
must understand why copyright law leaves this negative space and
why it would be difficult to come up with a legal rule that would
fill that gap. Extending copyright protection to ideas would be
exceptionally socially costly. Protecting ideas would give existing
authors much stronger monopoly power, which would
dramatically shrink the public domain—the library of preexisting
information goods that can be used in future creations.233 Once
ideas are protected, it would become significantly more difficult for
new creators to “create around” existing works and enrich our
world with new works.234 Moreover, as the Supreme Court
explained, if copyright law were to protect ideas, it might
conflict with the right of free speech as guaranteed by the
First Amendment.235
Devising a narrower sui generis property regime over some
public ideas, such as ideas that are used in conceptual art
installations, would be extremely challenging. First, the
constitutionality of such an act is questionable. It is not clear that
Congress is authorized by Article I to extend copyright beyond

Moreover, as section III.A explains, the social norms create artificial scarcity. So do
property rights. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 275 (1977). And while this section suggests that society should prefer the first
over the latter, one cannot rule out that a solution that does not entail scarcity at all might be
preferable. For example, the government can pay conceptual artists for their creativity and
allow anyone to use their works in a non-rivalrous way. In that way, instead of having one
copy of a Felix Gonzalez-Torres work, located in a specific museum, every museum
interested in conceptual art would present it. Wouldn’t that be better for consumers of fine
art? Such an approach, of course, entails a host of other difficulties. For example, is it justified
to spend taxpayers’ money on conceptual art? And how does such a scheme affect free
artistic expression in a free society? In the context of fine art, patronage has significant social
costs, mainly because it is, and always has been, linked to censorship. See, e.g., Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 353 (1996).
As I hope this note makes clear, assessing the overall desirability of the social norms
of the art world goes well beyond the scope of this Article. In fact, it is doubtful that such an
inquiry can be completed without assessing the overall operation of the art world itself and
the government’s effects on it and related markets.
233. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990) (explaining the
importance of a robust public domain to future creators).
234. See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1337
(2015) (explaining how copyright law channels future creativity).
235. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012).
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expressions,236 and it is similarly doubtful that such an act would
survive First Amendment scrutiny.237 Second, even if Congress is
allowed to pass such legislation, it would be exceptionally difficult,
probably impossible, to accurately define the scope of such a right.
Indeed, the drafting of such a bill would be problematic. VARA
provides an analogy to this challenge. VARA bestowed moral
rights only to fine artworks, but its attempt to do so resulted in
repeated litigation at the margins. Time and again courts are asked
to decide if certain works—such as photographs or alleged applied
art—fall under the scope of VARA or not.238
The challenge here is significantly more complex than the one
that the VARA drafters faced. First, sui generis legislation would
need to identify the works whose ideas it protects. As explained
throughout this Article, there are many forms of fine art that do not
need idea protection—from a Van Gogh painting to Duchamp’s
Fountain. Second, the drafters would need to identify which ideas
within any work should be protected and to what extent.
Obviously, the law does not need to limit an individual’s ability to
buy 175 pounds of candies for a party, but creating a legislative
scheme that would separate such a case from now-unauthorized
copying of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), which consists of

236. The Supreme Court typically read Congress’s authority under the IP Clause of the
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, quite broadly. E.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
208–10 (2003) (holding that Congress’s authority to enact copyright protected for “limited
Times” does not preclude extending the protection period from time to time); Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56–58 (1884) (holding that Congress’s authority to
grant exclusive rights over “writings” extends to photographs). However, the Court
has never considered an attempt to protect ideas, and it is therefore unclear whether it would
agree that Congress’s authority to protect “writings,” as the term is used in the IP Clause,
extends that far. It is similarly unclear whether Congress can bypass such limitations on its
power under the IP Clause, if they exist, and pass copyright-like laws using its commerce
power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and
Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 274 (2004) (“The overwhelming view
among commentators is that the Intellectual Property Clause’s limits apply to all of
Congress’s powers . . . .”).
237. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 2016) (considering
whether a mobile replica of a 16th-century Spanish galleon, built from a used school bus, is
protected under VARA); Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 291–92 (7th Cir. 2011)
(considering whether a wildflower garden is protected under VARA); Kleinman v. City of
San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 324 (5th Cir. 2010) (considering whether a wrecked car that has
been painted and put to use as a cactus planter is protected under VARA); Lilley v. Stout,
384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 85–89 (D.D.C. 2005) (considering whether an artistic photograph is
protected under VARA).
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175 pounds of candies, would be challenging. The risk of overbroad
legislation, which would unnecessarily shrink the public domain
and might harm free speech, would make the legislative
endeavor grueling.
Lastly, there is no need for a legislative reform that will provide
property-like protection to ideas, because the current system seems
to operate adequately.239 The pseudo personal property regime
carefully addresses the challenges that might be unresolvable in a
legislative reform. Because the social norms are shared by the fine
art world, but not beyond it, the rights themselves are applicable
only to the type of fine artists whose works are exhibited in
museums and galleries. It, therefore, does not present the same
overbreadth problem associated with federal laws. Moreover, the
scheme is limited to the type of copying that harms artists while
allowing others to create around it.240 The social norms thus offer a
level of flexibility that a legislative scheme typically lacks.
B. Recalibrating Copyright Authorship
The art world’s perception of authorship is rich and complex,
and it challenges the ways in which the term is understood under
copyright law. Comparing the social norms of this industry and
copyright law’s account of authorship sheds light on certain
underlying assumptions in our legal system and might require
recalibration of existing legal tests. Indeed, while the previous
section of this Article suggests that the law should not protect
public ideas, this section notes that the law concerning the
protection of expressed ideas might need slight recalibration.
Authorship is an important and complex concept in copyright
law. Therefore, it is not surprising that it attracts much attention
from courts and scholars.241 Authors are the stars of our copyright
system. The IP Clause of the Constitution authorized Congress to
“[S]ecur[e] . . . to authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings,”242 and the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that one

239. Of course, the superiority of the current system does not mean it cannot be
improved, as suggested in the rest of this Part.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 216–18.
241. See, e.g., supra note 42.
242. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
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of the primary goals of copyright law is to “protect the author’s
incentive to create.”243
The Copyright Act provides that authors are the initial owners
of the copyright in a work.244 Identifying the author, or authors, is
therefore crucial when disputes arise among individuals who
contributed to the creation of a final product. Those disputes
require copyright law to figure out who among a group of creators
should be considered the author—which turns out to be a difficult
question. Those situations are not rare. A movie, for example,
benefits from the creativity of the producer, director, screenwriters,
actors, photographers, lighting director, costume designers, and
many more.245 Authorship determines who within this large group
is elevated and receives property rights in the final product and
who is left out.246 Similar questions arise in many other forms of
creativity, from music247 to software,248 and more.
Authorship has received growing attention in the 21st century.
For example, copyright law’s tendency to deny most performing
artists (e.g., vocalists and actors) authorship status has been harshly
criticized in recent years, especially on equitable grounds.249
In 2012, partly in response to those claims, the World Intellectual

243. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 450 (1984); see also
N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U. S. 483, 524 (2001).
244. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (“Copyright . . . vests initially in the author . . . of
the work.”).
245. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742–43 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
246. See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, L.L.C. v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a
producer and not a director is the author); Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742–43 (holding that the movie
producer and director is the sole author and not an actor); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d
1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a director and not an advisor on set is the author).
247. See, e.g., Guy A. Rub, Stronger Than Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in
Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 116–17 (2013) (discussing how, under some
circumstances, band members and even sound mixers can be considered joint authors).
248. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Software’s Copyright Anticommons, 66 EMORY L.J. 265,
293 (2017).
249. E.g., Tuneen E. Chisolm, Whose Song is That? Searching for Equity and Inspiration for
Music Vocalists Under the Copyright Act, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 274 (2017); F. Jay Dougherty,
Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law,
49 UCLA L. REV. 225 (2001). But see Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American Copyright
Law, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (suggesting that under existing copyright law, actors may be
considered authors). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(5)(A) (2018) (setting forth a voluntary
mechanism to compensate “a producer, mixer, or sound engineer who was part of the
creative process that created a sound recording,” a provision added to the Copyright Act in
October 2018 as part of the Music Modernization Act, to better compensate all those who
participate in the creative process).
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Property Organization (WIPO) adopted the Beijing Treaty on
Audiovisual Performances.250 In addition, modern technology,
which fosters large-scale collaborative projects, such as Linux and
Wikipedia, further challenges existing notions of authorship.251
Copyright law has developed complex tests to tackle
authorship.252 The heart of those tests has to do with control during
the creative process. The Ninth Circuit, for example, noted that “an
author ‘superintends’ the work by exercising control[,]”253 and
while authorship is a multi-factor inquiry, “[c]ontrol in many cases
will be the most important factor.”254 But control over what? The
Supreme Court answered that an author controls the fixation of the
work: “[T]he author is the party who actually creates the work, that
is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression
entitled to copyright protection.”255 The result is that the individual
who made the choices regarding the expressive elements in the
work by fixing them, or by controlling their fixation, is the author.
In many contexts this rule makes sense. Copyright law elevates
fixation of original expressive elements.256 It, therefore, follows that
those who make such contributions will be granted legal rights.
Moreover, this rule incentivizes those parts of the creative process
that are exceptionally socially desirable and that are commonly
resource-consuming: expressing ideas and fixing them.257
However, in some circumstances, placing the entire weight of
our copyright law system on the fixation of expressive ideas is
questionable. For example, as already noted, many have claimed

250. Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, supra note 42. The treaty entered into
force on April 28, 2020, after it was approved by 30 countries. Beijing Notification No. 31:
Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/beijing/treaty_beijing_31.html.
251. Kaminski & Rub, supra note 42, at 1126–27.
252. Id.
253. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (footnotes omitted).
254. Id.
255. Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 737 (1989) (emphasis
added); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 744 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
256. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
257. See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 723 (2003)
(“One virtue of fixation is that it increases the likelihood that the relevant expression will be
passed from place to place, person to person, and generation to generation.”); supra text
accompanying notes 221–22 (explaining that in many cases the value of the work is mainly
attributed to its expressions and not its ideas).
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that this approach unfairly minimizes the contribution of
performers and their creative choices.258
Conceptual art provides an even starker example for the
shortcomings of the current approach to copyright authorship and
its oversimplified underlying assumptions. As explained, under
copyright law, the author is the one who “translates an idea into a
fixed, tangible expression,” or in other words, controls the fixation
of the expressive elements of the work.259 Applying this rule to
conceptual artworks, however, leads to absurd results.
For example, Felix Gonzalez-Torres came up with the idea to
“Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.),260 but he did not exercise any
control over the fixation of that idea. In fact, he did not even
determine the attributions of that expression but left those simple
choices to those who execute his works, typically museum curators.
As curators make those choices (for example, whether to place the
candies in a square or a circle), they control the fixation process,
and, if the result is protected by copyright,261 they—the curators—
are the authors.
Any fan of the arts, and even more so any industry insider,
including every curator I spoke with, would find this result absurd,
if not offensive. The work, as perceived by the art world, is the idea,
and all rights in it should be given to the person who came up with
that idea and not the individuals who execute it. Typically, the
curators’ names will not even be mentioned next to the work and
will be known to only a few of the exhibit goers. The candy
installations are, as far as the social norms of the art world are
concerned, a work by Felix Gonzalez-Torres.
This gap between the industry perception and the law might
require our legal system to come up with more sophisticated ways
to determine authorship. Such a system could embrace a more
holistic view of creativity, taking into account those cases in which

258.
259.
260.
261.

See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
Supra note 255 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 74–80.
See supra text accompanying notes 131–34. It is unclear whether such an
installation can be protected by copyright. It mostly depends on whether the aesthetic
choices, made in this case by the curators, show a “creative spark[,]” thus meeting the
required standard for originality. Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991); see also supra note 128.
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a major artistic contribution might not express itself through
control over the fixation process.
The authorship caselaw includes clues for such a holistic
approach. For example, the Ninth Circuit mentioned that one of the
factors in determining authorship is whether “the audience appeal
of the work turns on both contributions.”262 This factor opens the
door for considering the views of third parties, for example,
museum goers, and those they perceive to be the main contributors
and the creators of the work. The Ninth Circuit, however, went on
and explicitly held that this factor—the audience perspective—is
not as important as the question of control,263 thus undermining the
value of other factors.
This Article, however, and the norms of the art world it
explores, might put into question that preference—meaning,
the current focus on control over fixation—and instead advocates
for a more balanced approach. That approach might need to place
more weight than is currently placed on the ways in which the
audience and the industry perceive creative contribution, at times
even at the expense of those who control the fixation process.
The social norms of the pertinent industry can be used to inform
such a determination.
C. Challenging Private Property Ownership Standardization
The social norms of the art world, and especially their treatment
of conceptual art, can contribute to a deeper understanding of the
notion of private property ownership and help shape intellectual
property law. One of the thorny questions concerning private
property ownership is whether and to what extent sellers of chattel
can transfer ownership to a buyer while restricting that buyer’s
(and future owners’) rights to transfer and/or freely use their
purchased good. In other words, does the private property
ownership interest of the buyers entail freedom from such
limitations, or can sellers encumber the chattel?

262. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
263. Id.
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While this question has been debated in various contexts for
centuries,264 it is taking a more central stage in legal discourse in
recent years. One reason for this renewed interest has to do with
changes in the law, especially in the context of items that are
protected by intellectual property rights. Intellectual property law
tries to preserve private property ownership, at least to a degree,
through the doctrines of IP exhaustion. Those doctrines sever the
link between the rights-owner/seller and the buyer by limiting the
control that the rights-holder can exercise once an item is sold.265
In the context of copyright law, exhaustion allows buyers to
transfer their purchased copies (e.g., books and CDs) to others and,
in certain circumstances, to publicly display them,266 but not to
make copies thereof.267 This is part of the balance that copyright law
aims to preserve between conflicting interests: the need of authors
to be paid, especially when new copies are created, and the need of
the buyers of specific copies to be allowed to exercise ownership
interest and use those copies.268
In recent years, in two important decisions, the Supreme Court
broadened IP exhaustion, holding, inter alia, that neither a
copyright holder nor a patentee can prevent unauthorized
importation of IP protected chattel (e.g., books and medicines)

264. The most famous discussion of this issue was probably in Lord Coke’s 17th
century treatise. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND § 360, at 223 (London, Adam Islip 1628) (“[I]f a man be possessed of . . . a horse, or
of any other chattell . . . and give or sell his whole interest . . . therein upon condition that the
[d]onee or [v]endee shall not alien[ate] the same, the [condition] is voide, because his whole
interest . . . is out of him.”); see also Rub, supra note 48, at 759–62 (discussing modern use of
Lord Coke’s statement, from the partial critique in JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE
ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (1895) to the Supreme Court’s favorable reliance in Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013)). For modern in-depth discussion on the
issue, see, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004);
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 906–24 (2008).
265. See Shubha Ghosh, The Implementation of Exhaustion Policies: Lessons from National
Experiences, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Nov. 2013), https://www.
ictsd.org/sites/default/files/downloads/2014/01/the-implementation-of-exhaustionpolicies.pdf (exploring various IP exhaustion regimes).
266. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2018).
267. See Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 657 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he
creation of such new phonorecords involves unauthorized reproduction, which is not
protected, or even addressed, by [17 U.S.C.] § 109(a).”); see also Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,
569 U.S. 278 (2013) (holding a farmer liable for creating copies of patented grains).
268. See Rub, supra note 48, at 755.
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purchased abroad.269 Those decisions disrupt well-established
practices of many rights-holders, which are expected to try and find
other ways to exercise legal post-sale control.270 This will likely
generate additional litigation in the years to come.
The ongoing policy debate concerning post-sale restrictions,
especially on chattel that is protected by intellectual property
rights, is complex, and a full analysis thereof is beyond the scope
of this Article.271 One common argument in this debate, however,
is that enforcing post-sale restraints is simply inconsistent with our
notions of what private property ownership means and entails.
The Supreme Court partly accepted this argument in its recent
exhaustion caselaw when it relied on the common law aversion
to restrictions on alienation272—an aversion that is rooted in
those restrictions being “repugnant to the . . . fee.”273 Other
commentators similarly claim that enforcing certain post-sale
restrictions might mark “The End of Ownership,” and frustrate the
reasonable expectation of buyers.274
The focus on the nature of private property ownership relates
to well-established legal norms that require property rights to be
standardized and limited to a fixed number of forms.275 The
common explanation for this rule of standardization is that it helps
minimize transaction costs. Because property rights are in rem (i.e.,
binding on the entire society), the argument goes, it is important to

269. Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017); Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
270. Courts already allow right-holders to partly circumvent exhaustion. See, e.g.,
ReDigi, 910 F.3d at 655 (holding that a license is needed for reselling digitally downloaded
songs); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a software
company can prevent a buyer from unbundling and separately reselling a package of its
software products).
271. See, e.g., Ariel Katz, Aaron Perzanowski & Guy A. Rub, The Interaction of Exhaustion
and the General Law: A Reply to Duffy and Hynes, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 8, 24 (2016) (pointing
to “various competing interests and considerations [that] should continue to inform the
evolution of the law [of exhaustion]”).
272. See, e.g., Impression Products, 137 S. Ct. at 1532; Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 538–39; see also
supra note 264 and accompanying text.
273. Rub, supra note 48, at 759–62.
274. AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016).
275. This rule exists in most legal systems. In Civil Law countries it is known as
the “Numerus Clausus principle.” See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1,
3–4 (2000).
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prevent unusual property forms. Otherwise, individuals will need
to spend significant resources investigating the nature of the
property rights by which they, like everyone else, are bound.276
Creating idiosyncratic post-sale limitations might, therefore,
undermine that principle and raise information costs.
However, a broader view of private property ownership
reveals a more complex reality. Lawrence Lessig’s famous pathetic
dot theory suggests that behavior is shaped by four forces: the law,
the market, physical and technological constraints (Lessig called
them collectively “the architecture”), and social norms.277 In our
context, the law’s attempt to simplify and limit the notion of private
property ownership is undermined by the three other forces (the
market, the technology, and the social norms). Together they
present a richer and more flexible perception of ownership.
Recent developments in the marketplace and in its architecture
(i.e., the available technology) draw attention and undermine
certain common views of private property. First, the growth of the
sharing economy causes more and more consumers to purchase
temporary services (e.g., Uber rides) at the expense of permanent
ownership (e.g., buying a car), and thus weakens the centrality of
private property ownership in our society.278 As one commentator
bluntly put it, “Millennials are losing interest in ownership. They
prefer to access property as needed on a casual, short-term basis.”279
Second, the Internet of Things, where purchasers buy items that
permanently rely on the sellers’ cloud services to operate properly,
challenges the notion of private property ownership that is free of
the seller’s post-sale control.280 Third, digital reading devices, like
Amazon’s Kindle, similarly allow individuals to “buy” an e-book

276. Id. at 8.
277. LESSIG, supra note 50, at 121–25.
278. See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 49, at 1380–94 (examining how the sharing economy,

among others, challenges the notions of exclusion and possession of chattel); Kellen Zale,
Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 510 (2016) (discussing how the sharing economy
blurs distinctions between property law categories that were previously clearer).
279. Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 155 (2017).
280. See, e.g., Christina Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things,
50 GA. L. REV. 1121 (2016) (discussing how the Internet of Things challenges the common law
rules against servitudes on chattel).
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when, in fact, they are getting nothing more than an ability to access
their “purchased item” on the corporation’s servers.281
This Article provides another example of the flexibility of
private property ownership, but one that is not rooted in the market
or the architecture. Instead, it stems from Lessig’s fourth force:
social norms. Specifically, the social norms of the art world that this
Article explores, especially those concerning conceptual art, give
artists such a pivotal role in decisions concerning the use of their
sold works that they undermine the perception of a sale as a
transfer of ownership rights that severs the sellers’ interest.
Museums and collectors pay millions for works of art, but when
they want to use their purchased goods, they—according to the
well-established social norms of the industry—need to consult with
the sellers-artists. This norm is especially strong for a sale of
conceptual art, regardless of the price that the buyer paid, or was
willing to pay, for the work.
Take, for example, a typical Sol LeWitt wall painting. The work
itself—the one that buyers pay a small fortune for282—consists of a
set of instructions on how to execute a simplistic wall drawing.283
However, my industry-insider interviewees explained that LeWitt
and his estate do not just require that the painting be executed
exactly according to those instructions, but that they be executed by
what some of them referred to as “an authorized painter.” The list
of authorized painters, who are paid generously for their services,
is short. Those on that list were selected originally by LeWitt and
now, after his passing, by his studio.
With that in mind, consider what a museum or a collector
purchases when it successfully bids on a LeWitt wall drawing. It is
something whose standard use (i.e., displaying it on a wall) requires

281. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 274, at 1–2 (recounting how Amazon
removed all “purchased” copies of an e-book from all users’ Kindle devices and pointing out
that this control cannot be exercised by sellers of physical books).
282. LeWitt’s wall drawings are often sold for more than $100,000. See, e.g., SOTHEBY’S
(May 15, 2014, 9:30 AM) [hereinafter SOTHEBY’S 2014], http://www.sothebys.com/en/
auctions/ecatalogue/2014/contemporary-art-day-sale-n09142/lot.503.html (wall drawing
sold for $437,000); SOTHEBY’S (Nov. 15, 2018, 10:00 AM), http://www.sothebys.com/en/
auctions/ecatalogue/2018/contemporary-art-day-sale-n09933/lot.109.html (wall drawing
sold for $362,500).
283. Karol, supra note 128, at 187. Those instructions are commonly available online.
See, e.g., SOTHEBY’S 2014, supra note 282 (posting the full instructions, which were sold
for $437,000).
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close supervision from the seller. It subjects the buyer to a host of
post-sale restrictions on its core interest in the item purchased. The
case of Sol LeWitt is not unique. As explored in section III.B, artists
routinely exercise post-sale control over the use of their sold works.
Therefore, the notion that a sale of chattel terminates the link
between the seller and the item sold—a view that the common law
and the Supreme Court maintain284—is inconsistent with the social
norms of the multibillion-dollar art industry. Participants in this
industry perceive the buyer as the owner of the work and expect
the buyer to be able to exercise many of the rights that are incidental
to ownership, such as the right of alienation. Nevertheless, that
does not mean that the ownership interest is not encumbered
as a result of the social norms that grant artists-sellers certain
post-sale rights.
As explained, idiosyncratic rights against the world, including
post-sale restrictions, might increase the transaction costs in the
marketplace.285 The art world industry insiders, as a relatively
close-knit group, might be able to mitigate those costs, but not
eliminate them. The norms of the industry, and the decisionmaking power they give to artists and their heirs, are likely well
known to all industry participants. Therefore, those insiders do not
expend resources in exploring whether the norms exist or not.286
However, the norms are flexible,287 which means, inter alia, that
different works are subject to different limitations.288 Investigating
those norms is apparently a cost that this industry is willing to bear
in order to serve its other priorities, such as faithfully representing
the creator’s artistic intent.
Indeed, it seems there is a tension between the theory of private
property ownership as a well-defined, static set of rights, which
does not allow sellers to exercise post-case control, and the reality
284. Supra note 264 and accompanying text.
285. See supra text accompanying note 276.
286. Cf. Rub, supra note 48, at 794–95 (suggesting how to calibrate the rules of copyright

exhaustion to reduce transaction costs in transactions involving uninformed consumers, but
allow greater personalization of rights where sophisticated parties are involved).
287. See supra Section III.C (discussing the flexible nature of the social norms
concerning post-sale control).
288. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text (comparing Felix Gonzales-Torres’s
vague instructions, which provide curators with significant discretion when installing his
work, with Sol LeWitt’s detailed instructions, which restrict the curators’ discretion and set
forth multiple procedures concerning the installation of the work).
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of the modern marketplace and its social norms. Going forward, the
law might need to adopt a more flexible approach to ownership
that better corresponds with the norms in multiple industries
and contexts. Future research will be able to use social norms
to further inform private property laws and to explore the best
ways to duplicate their flexibility while maintaining enough
standardization to keep transaction costs at bay.
CONCLUSIONS
Museums and similar institutions are willing to pay millions for
a form of ownership-like interest that the law does not recognize
because they are bound by the strong social norms of the art world.
This web of norms, which this Article explores, provides artists
with a set of powerful rights that only partly overlap with the
existing legal framework for protecting and incentivizing
creativity. Those norms guarantee the artists’ central role in the art
world and effectively and efficiently incentivize types of creativity
that our legal system does not, such as the creation of certain
public ideas.
This Article analyzes those social norms and shows how they
shed light on broader concepts and their underlying assumptions,
including our notion of copyright authorship and core principles
within our perception of private property ownership. The Article
suggests how the law might need to develop in order to account for
these richer understandings.
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